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Preface 
Universities now offer classes and entire majors relating to the issues of 
national and international security. That is how I ended up in Professor Marwil’s 
History of 9/11 class during the Fall 2012 semester at the University of Michigan. 
On the first day of class, Professor Marwil told us that we would be studying a single 
day in history for the entire semester. For some people, this was enough to turn 
away from the topic. But, the semester allowed me to immerse myself into a topic 
that would shape the rest of my college career. When reading the first chapter of 
The 9/11 Commission Report  (2004), I felt overwhelmed by all of the details that I 
was learning about the event and its aftermath. The class continually bombarded me 
with more details day after day. At the end of the semester, I wanted to continue 
working with the topic because I knew that fifteen weeks I devoted to the course 
only scratched the surface of my understanding.  
Then the research of other large “n” terrorist attacks began. Initially, I was 
fascinated with the emergence and reform of national security institutions as a a 
result of terrorist attacks. But I was operating under the misconception that every 
large attack results in some kind of response. Since then, I have broadened my 
research interest to analyze how nations respond or do not to large terrorist attacks. 
And I have come to realize that there are other responses to account for when 
analyzing the aftermath of large attacks.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Two bombs. Two trains. Two countries. Two terrorist organizations. Less 
than two years apart. The similarities could not be more striking. In spite of these 
similarities, the results were two completely different reactions. When Spain was 
attacked, it led to a change in the political party holding power in the government. 
Then the United Kingdom was attacked, which elicited no response, beyond judicial 
measures, from the nation. What causes the divergence between these two cases 
that share so many similarities? This thesis seeks to examine the two events 
described in this paragraph along with five additional case studies in order to 
understand the divergence in the responses to large “n” terrorist attacks.  
It may be surprising that some of the cases presented in this thesis showcase 
examples of countries that do not react to large “n” terrorist attack. This could be 
attributed to the way that terrorism is presented in popular culture. Television 
shows portray terrorism as a problem that can have a solution in twenty-four hours 
or elicits an immediate reaction. Yet this form of media rarely, if ever, shows a 
situation where a country does not react to a terrorist attack.1 But it is not just 
television that has captivated audiences with stories of terrorism, movies and 
literature provide additional mediums as well. Figure 1 and Figure 2 both show that 
there has been an increase in the literature written in English regarding the topic of 
terrorism.2 Using Google Ngrams Viewer, Figure 1 depicts the increase in fiction 
                                                          
1 For examples see 24, The West Wing, NCIS, Sleeper Cell, Homeland. 
2
 See Appendix B. 
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books that mention the words “terrorist,” “terrorism,” or the “War on Terror.” 
Figure 2 uses the same search terms, but it illustrates a similar trend among all 
types of literature (both fiction and nonfiction). The increasing trends indicate that 
these three subjects have received more attention in recent years. A proliferation in 
these terms has broadened the subject area and indicates that these issues are of 
growing importance. As the analysis that follows will prove, understanding 
terrorism— what it is, how it works, and its implications— has become the central 
focus for many scholars. Despite the proliferation in the subject, many questions 
remain unanswered.  
This thesis seeks to answer two questions. First, after a terrorist attack, why 
do some nation-states react and other nation-states do not? Second, if a nation-state 
does react, why is there variance in the reactions? By variance in reactions, there 
will be three coded responses: “Institutional Change,” “Policy Shift,” and 
“Government Change.” It is also possible to have one event coded with multiple 
types of responses. Each of these will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 Foley (2013) asks a very similar question to the second one that I pose in his 
literature review: “Why do states respond to terrorism in the particular ways they 
do?”3 Then he answers this question by stating, “…this question has received 
relatively little attention in the counterterrorism literature, which has tended to 
focus more on descriptive case studies and assessments of effectiveness.”4 While 
                                                          
3 Foley, Frank. 2013. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms, and the 
Shadow of the Past. New York: Cambridge University Press, 7. 
4 (Foley 2013, 7) 
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this thesis will employ descriptive case studies, the goal is not to assess the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. Instead, the focus of the work will be in 
understanding the variance in responses to acts of terrorism. Based on the literature 
that I reviewed, there have been no other authors that have employed the use of 
“Non-React” cases to distinguish the variances in responses of “React” cases. The 
parameters of the analysis for this thesis will be further defined in Chapter 2. 
Conceptualizations 
National Security 
National security is also referred to as homeland security, so many of the 
sources that I have reviewed use the term interchangeably. Conceptualizing national 
security is particularly challenging because it covers a wide range of topics, and 
because it is a constantly changing term. Thus, I will conceptualize national security 
in an overarching manner, which will show that I have an understanding of the 
complexity of the issue. Then I will provide a narrower conceptualization of national 
security. 
There tends to be two separate camps that form when conceptualizing 
national security: The first offers “traditionally narrow boundaries and specialized 
training, [and] argue[s] that national security must restrict itself to military defense 
against foreign attack,”5 while the second expands on that first conceptualization by 
“includ[ing] particularly every destabilizing or undesirable tendency internal or 
                                                          
5 Mandel, Robert. 1994. The Changing Face of National Security. Westport: Greenwood, xiv. 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
5 
 
external to a nation.”6 While Mandel writes about these opposing conceptualizations 
in 1994, these two camps still exist in Neack’s book, which was published in 2007. 
Specifically in Chapter 2, titled “National Security,” the author struggles with how to 
conceptualize the term.7 It is critical to have a thorough understanding of both 
conceptualizations.  
To begin, I will focus on the broader conceptualization of national security 
because the narrower conceptualization is a more focused version of the broad 
concept. Shearman explains that “To be secure, simply, is to be out of harm’s way. If 
something threatens harm then, depending on what it is, individuals or communities 
can develop strategic policies to deter, counter, or in the final analysis fight off 
threats.”8 I conceptualize national security through a two-fold manner.  
First, it is a process of identifying, and in some cases the inability to properly 
identify, potential threats. Second, it is the manner in which a nation-state works to 
combat those threats. National security includes securing citizens from threats that 
include, but are not limited to: internal security, external security, international 
security, border control security, economic security, human security, 
cultural/ethnic/racial security, health/biological security, natural disasters, violent 
state actors, violent non-state actors.9 The ways in which nation states can secure 
                                                          
6 (Mandel 1994, xv) 
7 Neack, Laura. 2007. Elusive Security: States First, People Last. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 13-
45. 
8 Shearman, Peter. 2004. "Reconceptualizing Security After 9/11." In European Security After 9/11, 
edited by Shearman, Peter and Sussex, Matthew, 11-27. Aldershot: Ashgate, 12. 
9 See for examples: Busby, Joshua W. 2008. "Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. 
National Security." Security Studies 17 (3): 468-504. doi: 10.1080/0963410802319529; Mandel 
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their citizens also vary. Those can include, but are not limited to: border/customs 
controls, limiting immigration into the country, economic sanctions, budgeting for 
intelligence collection/analysis, preparation of military forces, setting federal 
regulations regarding movement of people/goods/services, diplomatic venues.10 
Next, I will turn to a review of the relevant literature in order to garner a better 
understanding of the research questions.  
Terrorism 
Understanding terrorism as a concept can be difficult to grasp. Many authors 
point to the challenges of conceptualizing terrorism based on its varying nature.11 
On this point, Martha Crenshaw articulates that: 
It is thus necessary to recognize that an important aspect of terrorism is its social 
construction, which is relative to time and place, thus to historical context. It is not a 
neutral descriptive term. Even scholarly definitions of terrorism are subjective 
because they must take into account ordinary language uses of the term, which 
contain value judgments. […] Since “terrorism” is a political label, it is an organizing 
concept that both describes the phenomenon as it exists and offers moral judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1994); Neack (2007); Peterson, Susan. 2002. "Epidemic Disease and National Security." Security 
Studies 12 (2): 48-81. doi: 10.1080/09636410212120009; Richard, Anne C. 2005. Fighting Terrorist 
Financing: Transatlantic Cooperation and International Institutions. Washington, DC: Center for 
Transatlantic Relations; Shearman, Peter and Matthew Sussex. 2004. European Security After 9/11. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
10 See for examples: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report. 
1st ed. Washington DC: W.W. Norton; Richard (2005); Shearman and Sussex (2004); Seidenstat, Paul. 
2004. "Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector." Review of Policy Research 21 (3): 275-
91. Wiley. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2004.00075.x; von Hippel, Karin. 2005. Europe Confronts 
Terrorism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Wise, Charles R. and Nader, Rania. 2002. "Organizing the 
Federal System for Homeland Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas." Public Administration 
Review  62 (Special Issue: Democratic Governance in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001): 44-57. 
JSTOR. 
11 See for example: Alexander, Yonah, ed. 2002. Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Anderson, Sean and Stephen Sloan. 1995. Historical 
Dictionary of Terrorism. Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements: no. 4. 
Metuchen: Scarecrow Press; Crenshaw, Martha. 1995. Terrorism in Context. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press; Wilcox Jr, Philip C. 2002. "United States." In Combating 
Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, edited by Alexander, Yonah, 23-61. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
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A label is useful shorthand, combining descriptive, evocative, and symbolic 
elements, but its meanings are inherently flexible and ambiguous. They may even be 
contradictory.12 
Crenshaw’s assertion that conceptualizing terrorism is subjective can be seen 
through the various ways that other authors explain how they conceptualize the 
term. Anderson and Sloan (1995) provide a variety of conceptualizations, including 
the differences between international and domestic terrorism.  
The best illustration of how variant and flexible the conceptualization of 
terrorism can be is from the changes that have been made by researchers that the 
University of Maryland’s START Global Terrorism Database. The use of this database 
in relation to this thesis will be further explained in Chapter 2: Methodology. This 
database has information that was collected in two parts according to dates. 
Information collected from 1970 to 1997 is part of GTD1. Incidents that were 
collected for GTD1 used the following conceptualization of terrorism: “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a 
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation.”13 The researchers changed the conceptualization of terrorism when 
collecting the data for GTD2, which accounts for incidents that took place between 
1998 and 2007. An adjusted conceptualization for each event in this data was that 
the incident  
…had to be an intentional act of violence or threat of  violence by a non-state actor. 
 In addition, two of the  following three criteria had to met for inclusion in GTD2: 
                                                          
12 (1995, 8-9) 
13 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2012). 
Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
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 1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or  
   social goal; 
 2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or  
   convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences)  
   other than the immediate victims; and 
 3. The violent act was outside the precepts of  International Humanitarian  
   Law.14 
While there are various ways to interpret both of the conceptualizations provided 
by START GTD, this was the intent of the researchers. That way any future 
researcher would be able to use the data in a way that fit their own 
conceptualization of terrorism.15 Given that I have selected to use the START GTD 
Database, I have decided to keep my conceptualization of terrorism consistent with 
the GTD2 criterion.16 Additionally, using a broad-based approach to the concept of 
terrorism will match the broad-based concept of national security that has been 
selected for this analysis.  
Literature Review 
Institutions 
Before examining how institutions relate to national security, it is critical to 
define the term institution. Stone Sweet et al explain that “an institution is a 
complex of rules of procedures that governs a given set of human interactions.”17 
The authors point to the work of Douglass North as the basis for their definition. 
                                                          
14 (START GTD 2012) 
15 (START GTD 2012) 
16 For a complete literature review regarding the conceptualization of terrorism, please see 
Sinkkonen, Teemu. 2009. "Political Responses to Terrorism: Case Study on Mardid Terrorist Attack 
on March 11, 2004, and Its Aftermath." Dissertation. http://tampub.uta.fi/handle/10024/66534, 39-
58. 
17 Stone Sweet, Alec, Sandholtz, Wayne, and Fligstein, Neil. 2001. "The Institutionalization of 
European Space." In The Institutionalization of Europe, edited by Stone Sweet, Alec, Sandholtz, 
Wayne, and Fligstein, Neil, 1-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  6. 
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North states that “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction. They consist both of informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights).”18 Although North (1991) focuses his 
argument around the creation of economic and financial institutions, his definition 
still applies to political institutions, such as those for national security. These 
definitions for institution are broad in that each definition points to how people 
have created structures to oversee their encounters with one another, but those 
structures can be either informal or formal as North (1991) defined. A broad 
definition for institution will allow for a wider range of national security data to 
review.  
Now that I have a definition for institutions, it is important to understand 
why institutions emerge and change. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Knight (1998) 
provide explanations to the questions of why institutions emerge and change. One of 
the main points of Thelen and Steinmo’s work is “historical institutionalism,” which 
they explain “represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are 
mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place.”19 In order to help 
readers understand historical institutionalism Thelen and Steinmo compare and 
                                                          
18 North, Douglass C. 1991. "Institutions." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 97-112. JSTOR, 
97. 
19 Thelen, Kathleen and Steinmo, Sven. 1992. "Historical Institutionalism In Comparative Politics." In 
Structuring Politics: Histoical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, edited by Thelen, Kathleen, 
Steinmo, Sven, and Longstreth, Frank, 1-32. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2. 
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contrast “old institutionalism” to “new institutionalism”.20 They outline that: 
The “old” institutionalism consisted […] of detailed configurative studies of different 
administrative, legal, and political structures. This work was often deeply 
normative, and the little comparative “analysis” then existing largely entailed 
juxtaposing descriptions of different institutional configurations in different 
countries, comparing and contrasting. This approach did not encourage the 
development of intermediate-level categories and concepts that would facilitate 
truly comparative research and advance explanatory theory.21 
Yet, “new institutionalism” is based on rational choice institutionalists and historical 
institutionalists.22 Knight (1998) also uses rational choice theorists as the basis for 
his arguments. His main argument is that “social actors are motivated by a 
preference for social institutions that best serves their individual interests.”23 
Knight (1998) outlines three ways that institutions emerge or change: first is 
through social convention, second is through exchange and competitive selection, 
and finally, through bargaining and distribution.24 Knight’s theory of social 
conventions asserts that institutions arise as a result of repeated, coordinated social 
interactions between actors.25 The theory of exchange and competitive selection is 
about how institutions form through interactions that are much like economic 
market contracts.26 Finally, the theory of bargaining and distribution is a way “to 
explain the emergence of social institutions primarily in terms of the characteristics 
that distinguish different institutional forms,” so “this approach places primary 
                                                          
20 (1992, 3 and 7) 
21 (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 3) 
22 (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 7) 
23 Knight, Jack. 1988. "Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of 
Institutional Emergence and Change." In Explaining Social Institutions, edited by Knight, Jack and 
Sened, Itai. 95-119. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 108. 
24 (1998, 101-4;104-7;107-10) 
25 (1998, 102) 
26 (Knight 1998, 104) 
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emphasis on a comparison of the different outcomes induced by the possible 
institutional alternatives.”27 When Knight (1998) provides economic arguments, his 
work is very similar to North (1991). While Thelen and Steinmo (1992) also 
provide a rational choice theory to the emergence and change of institutions, Knight 
focuses his work on the use of game theoretical models to explain why institutions 
emerge and change.28 
National Security as a Collective Action Problem 
National security can be described as a collective action problem. Argomaniz 
(2011) and Bossong(2013) describe national security in terms of collective action. 
While both fail to cite Ostrom (1990), she is one of the most influential theorists on 
the subject of collective action. Collective action problems are centered on the use of 
common pool resources.29 Her argument is that in situations of common interests 
over shared resources, people will act selfishly to promote their own self-interest. 
As a result, people have implemented institutions to regulate their use of common 
pool resources.30  
While Argomaniz (2011) and Bossong (2013) never directly apply her 
argument, I apply it to their arguments on national security in the following way. 
National security is a collective action problem because the security of all (common 
pool resource) would benefit everyone, but no one government wants to bear the 
                                                          
27 (Knight 1998, 107) 
28 (1998, 96) 
29 Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
30 (Ostrom 1990) 
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total responsibility for providing security. Therefore, no one government (and in 
some cases no one institution within the government) provides security. It is 
important, when analyzing the data for my research questions, to examine national 
security through the lens of a collective action problem because it provides context 
for why the question holds merit for research. 
American Institutional Reform 
The literature that encompasses the formation of national security 
institutions in the United States is quite vast. Upon review of the literature, it is clear 
that the keystone document is The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). This 
government report has two main focuses: to (1) provide a detailed timeline of the 
events leading up to and surrounding 9/11 and (2) give recommendation about 
improvements that could prevent future attacks.31 It is apparent that the 9/11 
Commission is highly critical of the formation of the Department of Homeland 
Security. In chapter 12 of the report (”What to Do? A Global Strategy”), the 
Commission makes several recommendations about what the DHS should be doing 
to improve its overall effectiveness.32 Chapter 13 of the report (”How to Do It? A 
Different Way of Organizing the Government”) focuses on how the United States 
government should reform its national security institutions in order to become 
more effective as a group of institutions.33 While The 9/11 Commission Report 
thoroughly addresses the changes that should be made to the national security 
                                                          
31 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004) 
32 (2004, 361-398) 
33 (2004, 399-428) 
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institutions, the Commission never addresses how these changes should be 
measured. It is important to know that the proposed changes were non-binding 
recommendations. It is the duty of the United States government to decide whether 
or not these recommendations would be implemented.34 
Wise and Nader (2002) and Caudle (2005) both provide ways to measure 
national security institutions although their measurements are different. Wise and 
Nader propose that “the United States will likely be utilizing a dual-track 
intergovernmental approach” to national security institutional reform.35 That means 
that on one hand, the national security policy will constantly be debated and 
changed accordingly. The second track is the institutional networks (local, state, 
federal) are forming and re-evaluating how they function together. If one were to 
measure national security institutional reform according to this model, then it could 
be done in two parts. First, it is important to examine the national security policy 
that has been changed regarding the recommendations. Next, it is critical to examine 
how those policies influenced change at the local, state, and federal levels. 
Caudle, on the other hand, argues that “Results management relies in large 
part on the defining of the mission, key actors who must deliver it, and principles 
guiding those choices about results that should be achieved.”36 So instead of 
separating the analysis into two parts, as Wise and Nader (2002) propose, Caudle 
(2005) approaches the national security institutional reform as one process. She 
                                                          
34 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, xv-xviii) 
35 (2002, 54) 
36 Caudle, Sharon. 2005. "Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management." Public 
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utilizes the “capabilities-based planning and assessment approach” as a method of 
measuring and managing homeland security.37 She explains that “Capabilities-based 
planning and assessment stresses the capabilities to accomplish clearly-defined 
missions, such as preventing terrorists from hijacking airplanes.”38 
While Wise and Nader (2002) and Caudle (2005) propose different models, 
the two models work in tandem. Caudle’s capabilities-based planning approach 
could be used to analyze the policy changes that Wise and Nader expect to track in 
the first part of their dual-track approach. Then Caudle’s model can also be used to 
assess if the local, state, and federal institutions are able to implement the policy 
changes from the first part of the model. Her model is able to evaluate an 
institution’s ability for “identification of capabilities to approach missions.”39 I have 
found no research to date that reconciles these models. Additionally, while the 
literature has only used these models to explain institutional changes pertaining to 
national security after 9/11 in the United States, these models are applicable to 
many other cases as well. 
Analysis provided by Seidenstat adds a third dimension to the Wise and 
Nader model and the Caudle model. Seidenstat compares the pre-9/11 formation of 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).40 In this specific case, there was 
already an institution in place, the FAA, so it did not need to be formed, but rather 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Performance & Management Review 28 (3): 352-75. JSTOR, 353. 
37 (Caudle 2005, 356) 
38 (Caudle 2005, 369) 
39 (Caudle 2005, 357) 
40 (2004) 
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reformed. 
European Institutional Reform 
Most of the research on European national security institutions focuses on 
empirical data with examples of case studies of national security institutional 
reform.41 Sussex re-evaluates Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of the Civilizations.’42 
Argomaniz (2011) and Bossong (2013) both provide an empirical and a theoretical 
framework in order to understand the European Union’s counterterrorism 
institutional changes.  Additionally, both authors criticize other authors for not 
providing a theoretical approach to the national security reforms post-9/11. In 
particular, Argomaniz writes “Most studies have been empirically based, some 
elegantly analytical, others more descriptive; but EU counter-terrorism research 
remains under theorised.”43 
Despite similarities, Argomaniz and Bossong’s analyses diverge as well. 
Institutional, horizontal, and vertical consistencies are the core of Argomaniz’s 
theoretical analysis.44 He devotes a chapter to each of the theories (Chapter 4, 6, 7 
respectively). Institutional consistency is achieved when institutions have the same 
policies within and across countries.45 Horizontal consistency is critical to the 
European Union’s national security policy because the EU has a composite policy, 
                                                          
41 See for example: Bossong, Raphael. 2013. The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European 
Security Policy after 9/11. New York: Routledge; Shearman and Sussex (2004); von Hippel (2005). 
42 Sussex, Matthew. 2004. "Cultures in Conflict? Re-Evaluating the 'Clash of the Civilizations' Thesis 
After 9/11." In European Security After 9/11, edited by Shearman, Peter and Sussex, Matthew, 28-50. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
43 Argomaniz, Javier. 2011. The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, Polity and Policies after 9/11. 
New York: Routledge, 8. 
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meaning that all the countries in the EU must adhere to some similar policies 
regarding national security.46 Argomaniz describes that “vertical consistency applies 
to the process of coordination, cooperation, and communication to actors at the 
national and European levels of governance.”47  
Yet Bossong’s theoretical framework of “multiple streams” argues that there 
have been “windows of opportunity” for the European Union national security 
institutional reform.48 By this Bossong asserts throughout his book that there have 
been certain periods in history that have allowed for the necessary national security 
institutional reforms.49 That is because in times of crisis, the “window of 
opportunity,” governments have made changes to institutions to reflect a need for 
different institutional measures. Bossong’s theoretical framework of “windows of 
opportunity” is the set-up for his empirical analysis, which is devoted to unpacking 
the European Union’s counter-terrorism history from the late 1970s to early 2012. 
While there is some historical information in Argomaniz’s work, he argues that 
“coherence” or “consistency” is the most critical aspect of the institutional reform 
because “regardless of the practical adequacy of the [European] Union as an actor in 
a number of counter-terror aspects, consistency [or coherence] weaknesses 
undermine the added value that the Union could more broadly provide.”50 
                                                                                                                                                                             
44 (2011) 
45 (Argomaniz 2011, 12) 
46 (Argomaniz 2011, 14) 
47 (2011, 14) 
48 (2013, 142) 
49 (2013) 
50 (2011, 150) 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
17 
 
Even though Sussex does not directly connect with Argomaniz or Bossong it 
is still imperative to consider Sussex’s argument about re-evaluating Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of the Civilizations.’51 As Sussex explains, Huntington’s thesis 
“claimed to have identified the emergence of a new world order that would pit the 
‘West against the rest’ and particularly against Islam, was roundly dismissed for a 
variety of sins.”52 While Huntington’s thesis does not directly address national 
security institutions, the importance of this chapter for the literature review is that 
sometimes it is necessary to re-evaluate previously dismissed theories. Sussex 
makes two arguments regarding Huntington’s thesis. First, “that analysis of the 
evolving post-September 11 security environment lends greater weight to classical 
realist explanations than does a true clash of civilizations.”53 He also argues, on the 
other hand, that Huntington’s thesis “is correct in identifying culture as a motivating 
force for conflict on the intra-sate level of analysis.”54 
Beyond the theoretical analysis, there is ample empirical data and analysis 
about case studies of European national security reform. Von Hippel provides a 
volume in which several different authors thoroughly explain how France, Germany, 
Italy, Nordic countries, Spain, and the United Kingdom have had institutional 
reforms.55 Shearman and Sussex also provide country-specific case studies.56 The 
case studies provided by both literatures are particularly enhanced through the 
                                                          
51 (Sussex 2004, 28-50) 
52 (2004, 28) 
53 (Sussex 2004, 30) 
54 (Sussex 2004, 30) 
55 (2005) 
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work of Bossong, specifically the case studies that focus on the terrorist attack on 
Madrid and the bombings in London.57 Each of these case studies examines how 
Spain and the United Kingdom responded to their respective attacks.  
The terrorist attack in Madrid and the bombings in London took place after 
September 11, 2001, so some institutional changes had already been made.58 It is 
interesting to compare the responses of the United States after September 11 
(provided by The 9/11 Commission Report 2004) and the responses of Spain and 
the United Kingdom to each of the attacks (Chapters 6 and 7 in von Hippel 2005). 
For example, “International support for Spain resembled that witnessed after 11 
September 2001. Within Spain […] there were more volunteers than emergency 
services could accommodate.”59 Yet Bossong explains that “the EU’s reaction to the 
Madrid bombings was not a targeted response to the new terrorist threat, but could 
best be accounted for by the multiple streams framework that highlights more 
contingent agenda-setting and policy making dynamics.”60 The contrast between 
state level and regional level reactions might provide insight as to why different 
developed democracies have taken different approaches to national security reform.  
Applying the Balance of Threat Theory 
The balance of threat theory was first introduced by Stephen A. Walt. It is a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
56 (2004) 
57 (2013) 
58 See Chapters 6 and 7 in von Hippel (2005) 
59 Ramos, Ana. 2005. "Spain: Part I: Counter-Terrorism in Spain--An Overview." In Europe Confronts 
Terrorism, edited von Hippel, Karin, 123-32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 124. 
60 (2013, 73) 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
19 
 
modified version of the balance of power theory.61 Walt’s theory was explained in 
the context of why countries choose to balance or bandwagon when forming 
alliances. His argument is that the choices that states make when choosing to 
balance or bandwagon with other states is not based solely on the power of the 
other state. But rather, and as Walt argues, more accurately, states are making the 
choice to “…ally with or against the most threatening power.”62 The addition of 
assessing the threat of another state provided further criteria to be considered 
when making alliances. Katzenstein (2002) offers an interpretation on the balance 
of threat theory that places it in the context of terrorism.63 We will return to 
Katzenstein’s specific argument in Chapter 3.64   
To explain why Katzenstein applies Walt’s theory to the context of terrorism, 
it is critical to examine how Walt explains his argument. Walt outlines four different 
factors that countries will consider when assessing how threatening a state is and 
whether or not it should create an alliance. The four factors considered are: 1) the 
other state’s available resources; 2) the geographic distance between the states; 3) 
the relative offensive power; 4) the potential offensive intentions.65 Katzenstein 
does not directly explain his application of the balance of threat theory to terrorism. 
However, it could be described in the following manner. When deciding whether or 
                                                          
61 Walt, Stephen M. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." International 
Security  9 (4): 3-43. doi: 10.2307/2538540. 
62 (Walt 1985, 8-9) 
63 Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. "Same War Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism." 
International Organization 57 (4): 731-60. doi: 10.1017/S0020818303574033, 735. 
64 More specifically, Katzenstein's contributions will be assessed in the discussion section for the 
Japan 1994 and Japan 1995 cases. 
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not a terrorist organization is a threat, a country will consider four factors: 1) 
terrorist organization’s available resources; 2) the geographic location of the 
terrorist organization to the country that it has attacked; 3) the terrorist 
organization’s offensive power; and 4) the terrorist organization’s offensive 
intentions from its attack. These four criteria provide a way to analyze the threat 
that is posed to a state. While Walt applies these criteria to a state, it is possible to 
use the theory for assessing the threat that a terrorist organization poses. So for my 
analysis, instead of assessing a threatening state, a nation-state is assessing the 
threat of a non-state actor. 
There are some potential problems with applying Walt’s theory to terrorism. 
When considering a nation-state there is more available information about the four 
criteria that are outlined by Walt. While it is possible to obtain information about a 
nation-state regarding its organization and power, this information may prove more 
challenging to gather for non-state actors. As a result, I offer the following 
interpretations on each of the four criteria in my case studies. I use the relative size 
of the terrorist organization’s membership as a proxy for the organization’s 
available resources. My rationale behind this choice is that the members can be seen 
as an available resource and in many cases the members contribute financially to 
the organization. For the geographic location, my first consideration is whether the 
organization is based within or outside of the country in which the attack occurs. 
Walt states that “…states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
65 (Walt 1985, 9-12) 
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far away.”66 Based on this logic, a nation should be more likely to respond when it is 
attacked from within than when it is attacked from a non-state actor that is based in 
another state. In my analysis, offensive power is tied very closely to information 
about the available resources. The fact that an attack occurs indicates that the 
organization is willing to use its offensive power and that it possesses the resources 
and skills to do so. I use the combined magnitude as a proxy for the offensive 
intentions of a specific attack because the goal of these attacks is to kill or injure as 
many people as possible in order to create more fear.  
What the Literature is Missing 
My primary observation, after reviewing the literature, is that there is a lack 
of in-depth theoretical analysis of the institutional changes of national security in 
the United States. The majority of that type of analysis that appears in the literature 
is focused on Europe. While I do not intend to focus solely on the United States, I 
hope to fill this gap through the course of my thesis because it is important to 
provide a theoretical framework to analyses. A theoretical and empirical approach 
will allow me to fully immerse myself in the subject matter. It likely will also 
produce more data, which will either help confirm or nullify my hypotheses.  
My secondary observation is that there is no literature, that I have reviewed, 
that directly addresses my research questions. While many authors examine the 
reform of national security institutions following September 11, 2001, none seek to 
                                                          
66 (1985, 10) 
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understand why there is variance in the responses.67 Through my research, I would 
like to bridge the gap to understand why this variance exists.  
Hypotheses 
Given that this thesis seeks to answer two questions, there will also be two 
sets of hypotheses. The first question is: after a terrorist attack, why do some 
nation-states react and other nation-states do not? For this portion of analysis, I will 
apply Walt’s balance of threat theory. While I believe that this theory can be used as 
an initial assessment to explain why some countries react and others do not, it will 
not fully explain the first question. In addition to the assessment provided by the 
balance of threat theory, I expect that a country’s history and culture will also need 
to be considered. The data provided from the theoretical framework along with the 
historical and cultural background of the nation-states that has been attacked will 
provide a complete answer to the first question.  
The second question then focuses upon the nation-states that do react to 
terrorist attacks. As a reminder, that question probes: if a nation-state does react, 
why is there variance in the reactions? I have offered a hypothesis for each of the 
responses that I have coded for in the analysis.  
(a) Institutional Change: If a targeted country finds that a terrorist attack 
occurred as a result of a lapse in its national security institutions, then its national 
security institutions will undergo an organizational change in the aftermath of the 
                                                          
67 See for example: von Hippel 2005; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Shearman and Sussex 
2004. 
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attack.  
(b) Policy Shift: If a terrorist attack happens when a country is in 
negotiations with the terrorist network that causes the attack, then the government 
in the targeted country will change its policies for handling the situation from 
diplomatic to military. Thus there will be an escalation in the situation.  
(c) Governmental Change: If the citizens of a targeted country feel unsatisfied 
by the governmental response to a large terrorist attack and there is exogenous 
election timing, then an incumbent government or party will be unseated or voted 
out of office.  
Chapter Previews 
The purpose of Chapter 1 is to provide a statement of the problem and set 
the framework for the analysis that will be provided in this thesis. Now that the 
reader is familiar with the concepts that will addressed, more specific details about 
certain events can be analyzed. In Chapter 2, a detailed explanation of the 
methodology employed in this project will be provided. This section will provide the 
reader with a thorough understanding of the project layout and how the specific 
cases were selected for this thesis. The main analysis will be provided in Chapters 3 
and 4. Chapter 3 will unpack the case studies that have been coded as “Non-React” 
to terrorist attacks. This will be the first chapter that uses Stephen A. Walt’s balance 
of threat theory as it is applied to assessing the threat level of a terrorist 
organization. While the theoretical framework provides a foundation for analyzing 
these cases, additional factors such as a country’s history and culture will also be 
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taken into account. Chapter 4 provides the counter-cases to the “Non-React” cases 
analyzed in Chapter 3. All of the cases in Chapter 4 will be analyzed in light of being 
coded as “React” cases; and further analysis will be provided regarding the types of 
reactions that each case illustrates. A total of three cases will be examined in 
Chapter 3 and there will be four cases provided for Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
will provide my arguments about improvements for the balance of threat theory. 
Additionally, I will re-assess the hypotheses outlined in this chapter and will 
articulate the implications of my findings. This chapter will also provide ideas for 
future research on the topic and question at hand.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
Use of Global Terrorism Database 
 
Reason for Database Selection 
I selected the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is housed at the 
University of Maryland to help create my dataset. The GTD is part of the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, also known at 
START. This open-source database tracks national, transnational, and international 
terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2012. There are over 113,000 events that are 
included in the dataset.  
This database appears to be the most comprehensive open-source 
information available regarding terrorist attacks. Also, the database is available for 
download as an Excel spreadsheet. The dataset also includes its resources on most 
of the events that are documented, so it is possible to check the information for 
accuracy. For these reasons, I selected to use this database when compiling my own 
dataset. Additionally, other authors have endorsed the database in the following 
manner: 
Established in 2001, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terror’s Global Terrorism Database is the most comprehensive 
terrorism dataset, containing information on both domestic and international 
terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 2005. Such improved datasets will 
promote the use of regression analysis in terrorism research, which will perpetuate 
the debate over the merits of large-n versus case studies.68 
Information Missing in the Database 
Each event is coded to include anywhere from 45 to 120 variables. More 
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recent events tend to have more variables coded. Because there is variance in the 
coded variables, some of the events have missing information. For example, for 
some events the number of people injured is not reported. This is the case for each 
of the events coded on 11 September 2001 in the United States. There is no estimate 
or exact number of people injured at each of the event sites. Correspondence with 
the GTD revealed that “when media reports fail to disaggregate casualty counts…” 
the database opts to “use the average” for the casualty counts.69 So for some of the 
events the casualties and injuries reported are averages. It would be more ideal to 
have exact casualty and injury counts; however, sometimes the averages are the 
only open-source data available.  
There is one entire year missing from the GTD: 1993. All of the data from 
1970-1997 was originally stored as a hard-copy database. During the process of 
converting the files to an electronic database, the cards from 1993 went missing. 
While some of the information is available in the GTD Codebook, a majority of the 
information was lost.70 Because all of the data from 1993 is missing, it is possible 
that there are cases missing for the project dataset. If more time was available and 
there was enough open-source data, I would have attempted to recreate the data 
from 1993. Having a completed dataset would have made my results more 
comprehensive.  
Additionally, the missing data from 1993 is directly related to my case from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
68 Foley, Frank and Abrahms, Max. 2010. "Terrorism and Counterterrorism." In The International 
Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Denemark, Robert A. doi: 10.1111/.9781444336597.2010.x 
69 Miller, Erin. 2013. "Re: Global Terrorism Database Comment," November 13. 
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11 September 2001. Prior to the 2001 attacks, the World Trade Center has bombed 
when a truck bomb was detonated in the underground parking garage of the North 
Tower by al-Qaeda operatives.71 This will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Thus, it was necessary to obtain information regarding the number of casualties and 
injuries from alternative sources.  
Creation of My Dataset 
Using GTD 
First, the database was downloaded so that it could be further manipulated 
to suit the needs of the project. The database includes information about the 
number of people killed and the number of people injured by each event; it does not 
provide a column that adds that information together. This thesis is studying the 
how governments respond to large “n” terrorist attacks, so information about the 
magnitude of the events is critical. To measure magnitude in this study, an aggregate 
of the number of people killed and the number of people injured at each event was 
taken. Then the events were rank ordered so that the largest aggregate was moved 
to the top and the data appeared in descending order.  
The original database had over 113,000 terrorist attacks, so it was necessary 
to create a magnitude cutoff for the dataset that was created for this project. In 
order to be included in the project dataset, a minimum magnitude of 200 was 
required. Using a minimum magnitude of 200, there are a total of 150 terrorist 
                                                                                                                                                                             
70 (Miller 2013; START GTD 2012) 
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 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, 71) 
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attacks in the project dataset. The magnitude range is from 200-10,000. Because all 
of the events are stored as separate attacks, such as the 11 September 2001 attacks 
being recorded as four separate events, the next step was to combine all events that 
were recorded separately, but part of the same terrorist attacks together. This was 
accomplished by searching the GTD using the identification codes for each event. If a 
terrorist attack was coded as separate events, then each part of the attack will be 
shown as a search result if one identification code is used.  
After all of the necessary events were combined, the list was once again rank 
ordered based on magnitude with the data appearing in descending order. Then it 
was necessary to code each of the large “n” attacks as either a “Large,” “Medium,” or 
“Small” event. This means that the magnitude range had to be divided into 
approximate thirds. So a “Large” event is any magnitude greater than 900; a 
“Medium” event is any magnitude greater than 550; a “Small” event is any 
magnitude less than or equal to 550 to 200. The Table below shows the number of 
cases that were available after the initial coding process had been completed.  
 
Event Coding Number of Cases 
Large 10 
Medium 11 
Small 129 
 
Coding System 
Once all of the events had been coded as “Large,” “Medium,” or “Small” 
events, the next step was to determine if the government in a country had 
responded to the terrorist attack. So the events in each of the three categories were 
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then coded as “React” or “Non-React.” A case is classified as “React” if there are any 
actions beyond judicial measures that happen as a result of the terrorist attack. 
Conversely, a case is coded as “Non-React” if the only actions following a terrorist 
attack are within the bounds of a judicial process. This could mean investigative 
work, arrests, and trials of people involved in the attacks.  Then the “React” events 
had to be coded for “Institutional Change,” “Government Change” and/or “Policy 
Shift.” Each of the final codes will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4: 
Escalation in Reactions. Some events were coded in multiple ways, which could 
indicate a more dynamic response to a terrorist attack. A copy of the project dataset 
is available upon request to the author.  
Case Selection 
A total of seven case studies have been selected for further review from the 
project dataset. There are four case studies for the “React” responses and three case 
studies for the “Non-React” responses. The two tables below will indicate the cases 
that will be reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4. There are both a “React” and “Non-React” 
case available for each of the magnitude ranges. This will aid in the comparative 
methodology that has been selected for this project. Creating the magnitude ranges 
helped in the case matching procedure.  
 
React 
Large United States (2001) 
Spain (2004) 
Medium Russia (1999) 
Small Russia (2002) 
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Non-React 
Large Japan (1995) 
Medium Great Britain (2005) 
Small Japan (1995) 
 
The selection of the Russia (2002) case must be explained because based on 
the minimum magnitude range of 200, this case is not part of the project dataset. 
This event only has a total magnitude of 129. Yet there were a total of 850 hostages. 
A counterfactual history will be used in order to include this case into the project. 
Bunzl explains that “Counterfactuals are contrary to fact, so ipso facto they are not 
true (in the actual world), and, ipso fact, they leave no evidence.”72 Essentially, this 
means that a counterfactual history will seek to understand how the past might be 
different if a certain event had not occurred.73 The case in question is the attacks on 
the Moscow Theater. The event was initiated by the Chechen rebels, but was 
stopped by the Russian government. If the all of the hostages had been killed by the 
Chechen rebels, then the event would have been included in the project dataset. It 
would have been coded in the magnitude range of a “Medium” event. Since the 
attack was initiated and then foiled, it will be included on the basis of the above-
mentioned counterfactual history. Because the actual magnitude was only 129, it 
will be coded in the “Small” event magnitude range.  
 
                                                          
72 Bunzl, Martin. 2004. "Counterfactual History: A User's Guide." The American Historical Review 109 
(3): 845-58. JSTOR, 847. 
73 (Bunzl 2004). Throughout the article, Bunzl offers several examples from other authors who 
employ this technique. It appears as though this techique is most commonly used to understand how 
the present would be different if certain events in wars had not occured (See for example Bunzel 
2004, 846). 
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A Note on Style 
Before providing the next chapters of analysis, I wanted to make some 
general notes about style. When directly quoting authors, I decided to leave the 
quotes with the grammar, spelling, and phrasing as each would appear in the 
original texts. This is particularly relevant because I cite several sources that were 
produced outside of the United States. Additionally, there are several different 
spellings for the al Qaeda, but I have selected to use this form for my analysis.74 
Given that the spelling matters much less than its meaning, I just wanted to ensure 
that I was consistent within my work. Finally, I used some videos as background 
information in some of the case studies. The majority of this information has been 
paraphrased. If a specific quote is elicited, then it was provided from a transcript of 
the video, which can be found through the direct sources (with the exception of one 
video).  
 
                                                          
74 Other spellings include: Al Qaeda, Al Qa'ida, al Qaida. 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
32 
 
CHAPTER 3: “NON-REACT” CASE STUDIES 
 
Japan (1994) 
Given the nature of the events, the Japan 1994 and Japan 1995 events will be 
explained together. The strength of studying these cases together allows for a 
greater understanding to the choices that the Japanese government made during the 
mid-1990s when it was faced with terrorist attacks. Both attacks were conducted by 
the same religious organization and in many ways, as will be explained below; the 
events are directly tied to one another. An analysis of the response to the Japan 
1994 attack will be provided after the explanation of both the 1994 and 1995 
attacks.  Although, as explained in Chapter 2, it is still possible to study the Japan 
1994 case as a small event and the Japan 1995 case as a large event.  
On the evening of June 27, 1994, a group of religious cult members drove a 
truck into a quiet Japanese neighborhood in Matsumoto City.75 Once they parked, 
the group used a sprayer attached to the back of the truck to spray thirty kilograms 
of sarin into the air. The targets of this attack were three judges who had recently 
ruled against the religious cult in a land dispute.76 While none of the judges were 
killed, seven other people died and approximately five hundred were injured as a 
result of the sarin.77 
                                                          
75 Tu, Anthony T. 2002. Chemical Terrorism: Horrors in Tokyo Subway and Matsumoto City. Fort 
Collins: Alaken, Inc., 91. "Cult members involved were Nakagawa, Murai, Niime, Endo, Tomita, 
Nakamura, and Hashimoto..." (Tu 2002, 91). 
76 (Tu 2002, 90-93) 
77 (START GTD 2012; START TOPs 2014; Tu 2002, 100). There has been some variance in the 
reported number of people injured as a result of this attack. For example, Itabashi, Ogawara, and 
Leheny reported only 150 injuries (2002, 327). But as explained in Chapter 2, all information about 
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The religious cult responsible for this attack was Aum Shinrikyo (hereafter, 
Aum), which means “Supreme Truth.” Shoko Asahara, the man who founded the 
cult, had ordered the attack not only to attempt to kill the judges, but also to test the 
effectiveness of sarin. Asahara harbored a deep hatred from the Japanese 
government that extended beyond the judicial branch. After an attempt to run two 
dozen candidates in an election, in which none of the candidates won, Asahara was 
humiliated. He wanted to take revenge not only on the government, but also on the 
voters who had denied his political party a possibility at holding public office.78 
Additionally, Asahara wanted to bring more followers to his cult because he claimed 
Armaggeddon was coming and “The only way to survive the catastrophe would be 
to join Aum Shinrikyo.”79 So he needed a plan that would create a disaster, in this 
case the use of sarin, to convince other people to join Aum.80 
While emergency services were aware that people had been poisoned, the 
poisoning agent was not identified until July 4, 1994. It took seven days to identify 
the poisoning agent because sarin is not frequently made or used. This was the first 
use of sarin for chemical terrorism. Sarin was first developed by Nazi Germany in 
the 1930s. But it was never used by Hitler.81 The first known use of sarin against 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the number of deaths and injuries will be drawn from START GTD. 
78 Wright, Nicolas. 2008b. "Japanese Sarin Cult." International Terrorism Since 1945. London: British 
Broadcasting Corporation. 
http://search.alexanderstreet.com/proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/work/1598947. 
79 (Tu 2002, 45) 
80 (Tu 2002, 45) 
81 (Wright 2008b) 
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other people was by Saddam Hussein.82 Despite its limited use, its effectiveness is 
well-known: a drop on the skin is enough to kill a healthy adult.83 Brian Balmar, a 
researcher at the University College London, describes sarin as “…the poor man’s 
atomic bomb.”84 Because the Japanese authorities were initially unaware that sarin 
was the poisoning agent, no nerve gas antidote was used to treat the patients that 
suffered from the poison.85 
Initially, the police focused their investigation on the man who had been the 
first person to contact the fire department about the poisonous gas. They based 
their investigation upon the fact that he had many chemicals, including 
organophosphates, in his home. After an extensive questioning process, the man 
was released.86 In November 1994, the police received complaints of a noxious gas 
in Kamikuishiki, where the Seventh Satyan Aum facility was located. The Seventh 
Satyan was the location where Aum was manufacturing sarin. The police took a soil 
sample from the Aum site and found sarin byproducts in the sample.87 
Despite the evidence, the police were hesitant. A local newspaper broke the 
news about the police findings before any arrests could be made for the attacks. 
Asahara was shocked to hear that the police had found evidence from the sample 
                                                          
82 (Wright 2008b) 
83 (Wright 2008b) 
84 World Wide Entertainment. 2011. "Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack." Documentary. Where Were 
You.Geelong. http://search.alexanderstreet.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/work/1792926?play=1. 
85 (Tu 2002, 101-102) 
86 (Tu 2002, 109-110 and World Wide Entertainment 2011) 
87 (Tu 2002, 119) 
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soil and immediately began to fear a police raid.88 But the police raid never 
occurred. Tu argues that the raid never happened because of the Kobe earthquake in 
early 1995.89 And thus the close of the Japan 1994 case is with no police reaction to 
the use of sarin in Matsumoto City. A full analysis of this non-reaction will be 
provided after the events of the Japan 1995 case are outlined. 
Japan (1995) 
Having seen the effectiveness of sarin and needing a distraction about the 
disappearance of Mr. Kariya, Asahara ordered the use of sarin once again.90 This 
time his target was the Tokyo subway system during morning rush hour. On March 
18, 1995, he made the orders and on March 20, 1995, the plan was executed. The 
morning of the attack, five cult members carrying a total of eleven bags filled with 
sarin each boarded their targeted trains. The cult members, dressed as ordinary 
citizens, placed the bags of sarin on the ground in each train and punctured the bags 
with the sharpened umbrella tips.91 All of the selected trains had stops at the police 
headquarters, which Asahara chose in order to target the citizens and the police. 
Five subway lines were targeted by Aum Shinrikyo. Those lines were: (1) Hibiya 
Line from Kitasenjyu to Megro, (2)Hibiya Line from Naka Megro to East Zoo Park, 
(3) Marunouchi Line from Ikebukuro to Ogikubo, (4) Chiyoda Line from Abiko to 
                                                          
88 (Tu 2002, 121) 
89 (2002, 122) 
90 (Tu 2002, 141) Mr. Kariya was the father of a former cult member who had fled the cult. In order 
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Yoyogi, and (5)Marunouchi Line from Ogikubo to Ikeukuro.92 The effect of the attack 
makes it a large case within the dataset with twelve deaths and approximately five 
thousand injuries reported.93  
After this attack, it only took Japanese police two hours to identify the 
poisoning agent as sarin because there was leftover sarin in the subway cars and 
they had anticipated an attack after the 1994 attacks.94 This is likely because 
following the 1994 sarin attacks, American experts told Japan that the Matsumoto 
attack was simply a test for a larger attack that was yet to come.95 Authorities had 
reason to believe in advance of the subway attacks that the Tokyo subway system 
would be Aum’s second target.96 
Following the Tokyo attack, it took two days for the police to raid Aum 
facilities. The delay was caused from a lack of protective equipment for the police to 
use. This equipment was necessary because the police feared that Aum would strike 
using additional poisonous gas upon arrival at Kamkuishiki.97 During the raids, the 
police found a variety of chemicals that were available to Aum in large quantities.98 
In addition to the chemical stockpiles, “…police investigators found that the cult had 
developed other chemical agents, such as VX gas, tabun, and soman, and had also 
                                                          
92 (Tu 2002, 147-150) For a detailed account of the events on each of these trains, see (Tu 2002, 147-
150). 
93 (START GTD 2012) 
94 (Tu 2002, 157) 
95 (Wright 2008b and Tu 2002, 87) 
96 (Wright 2008b) 
97 (Tu 2002, 172) 
98 (Tu 2002, 172-176). For a complete list of the chemicals that the police seized and what each 
chemical was likely being used for see (Tu 2002, 172-176). 
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grown biological agents like the anthrax bacillus and Clostridium botulinum.”99 The 
police arrested about 450 Aum members in relation to the sarin gas attacks.100 Many 
of the arrested members were arrested on minor offenses, since “…the police could 
not link the Tokyo sarin incident directly to Aum….”101 
Immediately following the attack on the subway, Asahara demanded that all 
of the evidence of sarin production be buried and destroyed.102 This, however, did 
not stop the police from arresting him. After which, he was put on trial and 
sentenced to death.103 During his trial, Asahara plead not guilty to all charges; 
claiming instead that the cult had acted without his knowledge or approval.104 Since 
then, Asahara is no longer the leader of Aum and he refuses to speak to anyone.105 In 
Japan, there is a sentiment that the truth about the events was not realized during 
the trials of Asahara and other leaders of Aum.106 
According to START TOPs, “At its peak, Aum had 10,000 members in Japan, 
with 35,000 in Russia. Aum also had offices in the U.S., Germany and Taiwan.”107 
Today, Aum is operating under the name of Aleph and has renounced its past violent 
practices.108 The current membership of Aleph is about 1,500 people.109 Despite 
                                                          
99 (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 337-388) 
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Japan’s decision to not disband Aum, the United States includes this group under its 
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) classification.110 
Discussion 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Katzenstein provides his interpretation of 
Walt’s balance of threat theory as it is related to Japan. So to begin, I want to assess 
Katzenstein’s argument. Katzenstein offers the following application and 
interpretation of the balance of threat theory stating: 
Balance of threat theory offers a plausible situational analysis that focuses on the 
different magnitude and sources of threat. On September 11, the United States 
suffered massive casualties in one day as the result of an act of international 
terrorism. Germany and Japan experienced significantly smaller casualties over a 
period of two decades. Because it was attacked from outside, the United States 
responded with war; because Germany and Japan were attacked from inside, they 
did not.111 
Essentially, Katzenstein argues on the basis of the balance of threat theory that 
Japan did not respond to the Aum attacks in 1994 and 1995 because it was attacked 
from inside and because there were few casualties.112 Yet this application does not 
closely follow the four factors that Walt outlined. The Japanese government was 
aware of Aum’s available resources based on the evidence that they collected during 
the investigations following the 1995 attack. According to Walt, a country is less 
likely to respond to a threat the further the threat is from the country.113 Given that 
Aum was located within Japan, it should have been more likely to respond. The 1994 
attack signaled Aum’s offensive power. Additionally, the police had both the 
evidence that Aum was producing sarin and the forewarnings of their American 
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counterparts that Aum was planning a second attack. Thus Japan has responded, 
according to the use of the balance of threat theory, to the 1994 attack because Aum 
had signaled that its resolve to attack was high. If we use the combined magnitude 
as a proxy for the offensive intentions from a terrorist attack, then Japan should 
have seen the first attack as a small intention and the second attack as a large threat. 
This means that it should have been more likely to respond. Despite these 
interpretations of Walt’s four factors, Japan has still been identified as a non-react 
state for both its 1994 and 1995 attacks in my analysis.  
Even if we accept Katzenstein’s interpretations of the four considerations 
that a state makes when deciding how to perceive a threat, first we must classify the 
event as a threat. At the root of Walt’s balance of threat theory is that a country must 
perceive another country as a threat. To translate that to a terrorist organization, a 
country must perceive a non-state actor’s actions a threat. So both Katzenstein and 
Walt fail to analyze how a state will react if it does not perceive an attack as a threat, 
but rather as a different kind of problem. Japan did not classify either one of the 
attacks by Aum to be threats. Additionally, neither author include any information 
about how a country’s history and culture play a role in country’s decision on 
whether or not it will react to an attack by a non-state actor.  
In order to have a complete understanding of why Japan 1994 and Japan 
1995 have been coded as non-react events for the purposes of my analysis, it is 
important to begin with a historical perspective. Japan has an “allergy” to a strong 
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police and military force as a result of its post-war experiences. Thus the Japanese 
government is hesitant to make changes to the pre-existing policies and 
structures.114 This was illustrated in the cases above when the police arrest cult 
members on minor offenses and then question them about their involvement in the 
sarin attacks. Another way to think about the “allergy” analogy that is presented is 
to consider the subdued nature of Japanese culture. Additionally, in Japan, 
“…terrorism is not treated as a discrete political issue requiring a response but 
rather a subset of other types of crises, which include natural disasters and 
accidents.”115 Japanese counterterrorism built on the foundation that terrorism 
should be handled through “crisis management.”116 As a result, during both the 
1994 and 1995 attacks, terrorism in Japan lacked a focused strategy. This is a part of 
the possible explanation for Japan’s non-reaction to both events.  
It is important to note that there was an institutional reform in Japan 
following the 1995 attacks. However, the changes that were made were not a result 
of the 1995 attacks alone. The demand for institutional reform came as a result of 
the failing economy in the early 1990s in Japan, the political problems within the 
coalition government, the 1994 sarin attack in Matsumoto City, the earthquake in 
early 1995, and the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo.117 These events together 
intensified the idea among Japanese citizens that “…the Japanese government was ill 
                                                          
114 Itabashi, Isao, Ogawara, Masamichi, and Leheny, David. 2002. "Japan." In Combating Terrorism: 
Strategies of Ten Countries, edited by Alexander, Yonah, 337-74. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 339, 352, and 357. 
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116 (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 352) 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
41 
 
equipped to handle crises or deal with rapid, cataclysmic events in a way that might 
minimize the loss of life.”118 Yet there is a lack of literature that addresses the 
effectiveness of these changes. Given that the institutional changes occurred as the 
result of multiple exogenous factors, the 1994 and 1995 Aum attacks will continue 
to be coded as a non-react situation. If the other factors were excluded, there is no 
evidence to indicate the the Japanese government would have reacted beyond the 
judicial actions taken against Asahara and Aum’s other top leaders.   
United Kingdom (2005) 
On the morning of July 7, 2005, three bombs exploded, nearly 
simultaneously, in the London Underground during the peak of rush hour.119 The 
three affected locations were: (1) “A train just outside the Liverpool Street 
station…”; (2) “A train just outside the Edgware Road station…”; and (3) “A train 
traveling between King’s Cross and Russell Square stations….”120 About one hour 
later, at 9:47 A.M., a fourth explosion occurred atop a double-decker bus in 
Tavistock Square.121 A total of fifty-six people, including the four terrorists 
responsible for the attacks, were killed and 786 people were injured as a result of 
the explosions.122 For this reason, this case has been coded as a medium size attack 
                                                                                                                                                                             
117 (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 352, 355-356, and 360) 
118 (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 353) 
119 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005." 2006. Government 
Report HC 1087. London: House of Commons. http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.asp, 2. 
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in the dataset used for this analysis. 
There were four individuals that were responsible for the attacks in London. 
The group was comprised of Mohammed Sadique Khan (Edgeware Road bomber), 
Shahzad Tanweer (Aldgate bomber), Hasib Hussain (Tavistock Square bomber), and 
Germain Morris Lindsay (King’s Cross/Russell Square bomber).123 Khan, Tanweer, 
and Hussain met through various social groups.124 Lindsay later met Khan and 
joined the group and he is often referred to as the outsider in the group.125 Three of 
the four were second generation British citizens, while Lindsay was born in 
Jamaica.126 While all four of the men where open about their religion, they showed 
no outward signs of being interested in violent extremism.127 It is unclear whether 
or not the group had any direct ties with another organization. The method of attack 
followed the modus operandi of al Qaeda and al Qaeda later claimed responsibility 
for launching the attack; however there is no direct evidence that ties the two 
groups together.128 Khan’s last Will and Testament explained that the group’s 
motivation was to avenge the United Kingdom’s involvement in the Middle East.129 
The morning of the attacks, each of the men had a backpack in which he was 
carrying the bomb that would be used at his location. Based on CCTV, eye witness, 
and forensic evidence, it was estimated that each individual was carrying two and 
                                                          
123 ("July 7 2005 London Bombings Fast Facts" 2013) 
124 ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 15-16) 
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five kilograms of high explosives. All of the materials used in explosives were readily 
available in stores and relatively inexpensive. Additionally, the bombs that were 
built did not require much skill and instructions on how to make these explosives 
could have been easily obtained from open-source information.130 The location 
where the bombs were made for the attack was located on July 12th. It was an 
apartment that the group had sublet from an Egyptian PhD student.131 On July 13th, 
the police identified Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain as the bombers responsible for the 
Underground attack. The following day, Lindsay was identified as the perpetrator of 
the double-decker bus bombing.132  
In the weeks following the July 7th attacks, the police were able to use DNA 
evidence to directly tie three of the bombers to the apartment where the bombs 
were made133. Yet no arrests were made in connection with this attack until March 
22, 2007. Mohammed Shakil, Sadeer Saleem, and Waheed Ali “…[were] charged with 
unlawfully and maliciously conspiring with the four suicide bombers and of 
conspiring to cause explosions at tourist locations in London.”134 During trial, the 
three arrested men were all found not guilty of helping plan the attacks.135 Beyond 
the creation of the Official Report that has been cited throughout the previous four 
paragraphs and the arrests that took place two years later; this case is coded as a 
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non-react state.  
Discussion 
Once again, this discussion section will begin by analyzing the case in terms 
of Walt’s balance of threat theory. As a reminder, Walt’s balance of threat theory as 
applied to terrorism hinges on four factors: 1) available resources; 2) geographic 
distance; 3) offensive power; and 4) offensive intention. One of the facts that make 
this case difficult to fit into the framework of the balance of threat theory is that it is 
still unclear if the four bombers were directly linked to al Qaeda. Since no formal 
evidence can tie the two groups together, this case will be analyzed under the 
assumption that the four bombers were operating as a separate group. The available 
resources were all either used in the attacks or located in the apartment by the 
British police. So on this point, the government was less likely to have viewed the 
available resources to be a threat. Yet, the country was attacked by a group from 
within its own borders and arrests were made of additional men that could have 
been involved in the attacks. This should have made it more likely for a post-attack 
response to occur, beyond the judicial actions that were taken. In terms of offensive 
power, there were only four men directly involved in the attacks and all four died as 
they were suicide bombers. Again, using the combined magnitude to understand the 
offensive intention, this event was classified as a medium size attack because it has 
magnitude of 842 people.  
But the balance of threat theory framework does not provide a satisfactory 
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picture for why the United Kingdom did not respond to the London suicide 
bombings. The historical perspective for this case will be unpacked using two 
different historical events. First, it is important to consider the how the government 
handled the longstanding acts of terror in North Ireland. Next, the focus will shift to 
examine the role that September 11, 2001 played in changing structures within the 
government. From the historical background of 9/11 a British culture of how to 
handle terrorism will become clearer.  
The attack against the UK on July 7, 2005, was not the first encounter that the 
country had with terrorism. As a matter of fact, the country had faced nearly thirty 
years of terrorist attacks from the Irish Republican Army. Many of the attacks 
launched by the IRA took place in Northern Ireland, but some of the attacks targeted 
to the British mainland as well. This sustained period of attacks resulted in 3,075 
deaths.136 Foley reports that “2,950 of these were killed in Northern Ireland and 125 
in mainland Great Britain.”137 One of the first steps in understanding why the UK 
was a non-react state following the terrorist attack in 2005 is looking at how the 
country handled the encounters with the IRA. The response by the British 
government to the IRA “…was based mainly on coercive action by the military, 
police and intelligence services.”138 Various tactics were used in the coercive action 
including: internment, coercive interrogations, and detainment without trial.139 Yet 
Malcolm Gladwell in his most recent book, David and Goliath, explains that  
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In Northern Ireland, the British made a simple mistake. They fell into the trap of 
believing that because they had resources, weapons, soldiers, and experience that 
dwarfed those of the insurgent elements that they were trying to contain, it did not 
matter what the people of Northern Ireland thought of them. General Freeland 
believed Leites and Wolf when they said that ‘influencing popular behavior requires 
neither sympathy nor mysticism.’ And Leites and Wolf were wrong.140  
Essentially, Gladwell is explaining, through this quote and the rest of this chapter, 
why the fighting between the British police and the IRA was prolonged. His main 
argument is that although the IRA could be viewed as the underdog, which in this 
situation the British power was limited against the willpower of the people of 
Northern Ireland.141 The lessons learned from nearly thirty years of terrorist actions 
by the IRA were not lost on British officials. Instead, the British officials 
retroactively “…affirmed that responses to terrorism had to be ‘proportionate’, in 
order to not exacerbate the problem.”142 What we can draw from the British 
experiences with the IRA is that British officials realized that the use of force, 
against terrorist organizations, is not always effective.143 The influence of these 
realizations continues to manifest as we now consider how the UK handled the 
immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001.  
September 11, 2001 can be described as event that shaped not the United 
States, but various other parts of the world as well. The history of what happened 
following 9/11 in the UK is important to the study of why it did not react in 2005 to 
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its own attack because the decisions made in 2001 indicate a subdued approach to 
responding to terrorist attacks. In light of the history of the IRA, this subdued 
approach seems to have infiltrated the counterterrorism culture in the UK. 
Immediately following the attacks in the United States, “…a central Sub-Committee 
on International Terrorism was established under the Defence and Overseas Policy 
(DOP) Committee of the Cabinet Office” in order to “…review government policy on 
international terrorism, with a particular focus on the UK’s ability to locate, capture 
and convict suspected terrorists.”144 Ultimately, no large-scale organizational 
changes, such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the United 
States, were made because the British government did not feel that “…the US model 
would be either appropriate nor necessary.”145 Following the attacks in 2005, the 
idea of creating a department modeled after the DHS in the U.S. was reassessed. 
Those in favor of this option were the Conservative Party and many security 
analysts. However, the government ultimately opted to strengthen existing 
institutions and procedures.146 
The decision to not make any organizational changes in the UK following 
9/11 could be explained in a two-fold manner. As I explained above, the British 
government wanted to make sure, as a result of its history with the IRA, that it was 
making proportional responses to terrorist actions. Additionally, if we apply Walt’s 
argument that geographic distance is an important factor in determining the threat 
                                                          
144 (Foley 2013, 78) 
145 Cornish, Paul. 2005. "The United Kingdom." In Europe Confronts Terrorism, edited by von Hippel, 
Karin, 146-67. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 146-147. 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
48 
 
level of a terrorist action, then the distance between the attacks in the U.S. and 
security of the UK may have played a role in the decision not to make any changes 
following 9/11. Additionally, although the UK government was aware that there 
were Islamic extremists residing within the country, it did not believe that these 
extremists would pose a direct threat against the nation.147 So from a perspective of 
offensive intention, the British government also did not believe that it would be the 
target of any attack.  
Now that we have a clear understanding of how the historical context of 
terrorism in the UK has led to a culture that values a proportionate response or no 
response at all to attacks, we can examine how the UK perceives terrorism 
conceptually. Unlike “…the US government, which has tended to perceive terrorism 
as an act of war, …European policymakers …perceive it as a crime.”148 The UK falls 
into step with most European policymakers in the fact that it too perceives 
terrorism as a crime.149 Von Hippel (2005) would describe the choice to perceive 
terrorism as a crime as a more “tolerant” approach to the situation. She explains her 
argument by stating that 
European governments have historically adopted a more tolerant approach to 
dealing with terrorist-sponsoring states than the US government for three reasons. 
First, in general, Europeans consider it better to maintain a dialogue than not. 
Second, certain European countries have wanted to protect foreign investment 
opportunities, in particular in the oil and gas industries. Third, and relevant to 
Islamic extremist terrorism, many of these same European countries are home to 
large Muslim populations—approximately 20 million people in the EU refer to 
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themselves as Muslims—and therefore have been fearful of a domestic backlash if 
harsh action were taken.150 
Of these three reasons, the third seems most relevant to this case because of the 
large Muslim population that lives in the UK.151 The combination of treating 
terrorism as a crime and with a “tolerant approach” creates parallels to the reasons 
why both Japanese cases were also coded as non-react. In all three cases, we also see 
that there is a historical explanation for the way that terrorism is perceived. 
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CHAPTER 4: “REACT” CASE STUDIES 
 
Spain (2004) 
On the morning of March 11, 2004, just three days before the parliamentary 
elections, a series of bombs exploded disrupting morning rush hour in Madrid, 
Spain.152 Ten bombs, hidden backpacks, exploded on four commuter trains.153 
Crawford and Levitt explain that “The first explosions were at 7:34am, as two trains 
approached Madrid’s busy Atocha terminal. The other trains were running late, and 
the bombs exploded at Santa Eugenia and El Pozo, stations further down the line.”154  
If the other trains had been running on time, then all of the explosions would have 
taken place at the Atocha terminal, which according to a high-ranking Spanish 
diplomat would have left Spain with a situation similar to September 11, 2001 in the 
United States.155 The explosions killed 191 people and injured about 1,800 
people.156 This event is classified as a large event in the project dataset. 
Immediately following the attacks there was confusion about which group 
was responsible for the attacks. Prime Minister José María Aznar prematurely 
claimed that the group responsible was the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a 
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terrorist organization within the Basque region of Spain.157 The ETA was founded in 
1959 with the aims of creating a separate nation-state for the Basque region of 
Spain. These claims had a chance of sticking because the ETA had a reputation for 
similar attacks against the Spanish government in the four and a half decades prior 
to the March 11th attacks.158 Additionally, in the months leading up to the Madrid 
train bombings, there had been several attempts made by the ETA to execute attacks 
that involved using explosives to disrupt the train system.159 The day of the attack, 
Spain turned to the United Nations Security Council and asked for support through 
the passage of Resolution 1530. The U.N. Security Council was persuaded by Spain’s 
pleas and the resolution was passage to condemn the ETA for the attacks.160 Yet 
uncharacteristically, the ETA vehemently denied that it had executed the attacks 
and instead pointed to Arab resistance groups as the culprit.161 
While Prime Minister Aznar was claiming that the ETA was responsible for 
the attacks, the police were finding evidence in concordance with the ETA. Based on 
the evidence, police initially believed that the attacks were executed by Islamic 
extremists that were tied to al Qaeda.162 Even Spanish Interior Minister Angel 
Acebes stated on March 11, 2004 that Spain could not eliminate al Qaeda as the 
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group responsible.163 On March 13, 2004, al Qaeda released a video claiming 
responsibility for the attack. The video featured “…a man speaking in Arabic with a 
Moroccan accent.”164 Two days after the attacks, the Spanish authorities made their 
first arrests. A total of five men, three Moroccans and two Indians, were arrested 
after evidence from the scene linked them directly to the investigation.165 With 
continued progress in the investigation, the police were eventually able to tie the 
attacks to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GCIM), which has ties with al 
Qaeda.166 Formed in the 1990s, the GCIM is sympathetic to the international jihadi 
movement and was added to the United States Foreign Terrorist Organization list in 
October 2005.167 
The police investigation was aided by the fact that there was one bomb that 
did not detonate. Additionally, the police were able to locate three other bombs that 
they then detonated in a controlled explosion environment.168 With the unexploded 
bomb and evidence from the scene, the police, who had been handling ETA 
bombings for approximately 30 years, noted right away that the explosives used in 
this attack were different from those used in past ETA attacks.169 The explosives 
found inside the bag were attached to a detonator that consisted of a cell phone and 
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a timer.170 Specifically, the explosives used were dynamite.171 With the cell phone, 
the police were able to “…trace it to a business owned by a Moroccan immigrant 
named Jamal Zougam, who was suspected of having links to Al Qaeda.”172 Woehrel 
also reports that “Less than four hours after the attacks, police found several 
detonators and an audiotape of verses from the Koran in an abandoned van in the 
town of Alcala de Henares, through which the bombed trains had passed.”173 All of 
this evidence is what eventually lead to the arrests of the five men on March 13, 
2004. 
The arrests of the five men and an additional nineteen others before the end 
of March 2004 led to information suggesting that the specific group of individuals 
responsible for the March 11th were located in an apartment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
in Leganés174. A brigade of Grupo Especial Operaciones (GEO) was sent to the 
apartment to arrest the seven men located there. When the brigade arrived, the 
seven men resisted arrest in what became a shootout lasting several hours. The 
standoff only ended when “…the seven men inside committed suicide by detonating 
explosives strapped to their bodies. The explosion also killed special operations 
agent Javier Torrontera and wounded fifteen other agents.”175 One of the seven men 
was “…the alleged leader of the terrorists, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Farkhet, known 
                                                          
170 ("Spain Train Bombing Fast Facts" 2013) 
171 Jordán, Javier and Horsbugh, Nicola. 2005. "Spain: Part II: Islamic Extremism." In Europe 
Confronts Terrorism, edited by von Hippel, Karin, 132-45. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 137. 
172 (Woehrel 2004, 2) 
173 (2004, 2) 
174 This is a neighborhood located in Madrid, Spain. 
175 (Sunderland 2005, 20) 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
54 
 
as ‘the Tunisian.’”176 Once the apartment was raided, the police found plans and 
explosives for additional terrorist attacks to be executed by the group.177  
Discussion 
Before examining how this case functions within Walt’s theoretical 
framework, a resolution to the case will be provided. This case has been coded as a 
“React” case because there was a response following the attack beyond the judicial 
measures that were explained above. One of the most critical facts in this case is that 
the attacks happened three days before the parliamentary elections. Prime Minister 
Aznar was running for re-election for the Partido Popular (PP). Prior to the attack, 
election polls were reporting that the PP would defeat political opposition, the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). Yet as Sinkkonen succinctly articulates 
“…none of the polls was right: PSOE won the elections with a significant majority 
over the PP. This was an electoral overturn.”178 Therefore, this case is also coded as 
a case that displays a “Government Change” as the result of a terrorist attack. This 
case provides a counter-example to what might be anticipated as a political leader 
following a terrorist attack: the rally around the flag effect. Instead of experiencing 
overwhelming support from the public, the incumbent political party is replaced. 
In order to understand why the attack on March 11 led to a “Government 
Change,” it is necessary to unpack some of Prime Minister Aznar’s political decisions 
regarding terrorism. This has been best laid out in the following two-fold manner: 
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1) ETA had been enemy number one for Prime Minister…Aznar’s Government, and 
framing ETA for the March 11 attack would confirm that the enemy was rightly 
fought. 2) Aznar’s Government had taken a very unpopular and unilateral decision 
to participate in the U.S. led coalition in the Iraq war, and if the assailant in Madrid 
proved to be some Islamic group, it would easily lead to causal analysis that such 
participation had caused the attack. This would especially benefit the political 
opposition. The leader of the socialist party (PSOE) José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero 
had already promised in this electoral campaign that if PSOE were to win the 
elections, he would take Spanish troops out of Iraq.179 
Blaming the ETA for the attack would benefit Prime Minister politically. If Prime 
Minister Aznar’s government had been able to prove that the ETA was responsible 
for the attack on March 11, then it would have provided legitimacy to his battle 
against the terrorist organization. Ramos explains that “Aznar’s government could 
also lay claim to eight years of good economic results, a tough stance against ETA, 
including a number of high-profile arrests and the banning of its political wing, as 
well as a close relationship with the United States.”180 Additionally, by proving that 
the attack was not the result of an Islamic extremist group, Prime Minister Aznar 
would not have to continually defend his government’s decision to fight with the 
United States in the war in Iraq. Woehrel provides a similar analysis on the political 
advantages and disadvantages to making and proving claims that the ETA was 
responsible for the attack.181 
Before considering the actions of the new Prime Minister, the balance of 
threat theoretical framework must be applied to the case. The first consideration in 
this theory is the resources available to the group, which must be evaluated in light 
of the ties between the GCIM and al Qaeda. Given the ties between the two groups, 
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the available resources, while unknown, can be expected to be quite high quality 
and quantity. Spain and Morocco are situated very close together geographically. As 
a matter of fact, the states are nearly connected but for a water passage between the 
two. Much like the available resources, the offensive power of these two terrorist 
organizations is not entirely measurable; but given that this event took place three 
years after September 11, Spain would have knowledge about al Qaeda’s offensive 
power. And unlike United Kingdom 2005 case, the seven terrorists that died after 
committing suicide can be traced to larger terrorist networks. This leads to the 
consideration of offensive intention of the group. With a combined magnitude of 
1,991 people injured or killed as a result of this attack, the impact was enough to 
consider this case to be a large event in my dataset. All of these considerations 
paired with campaign promises are what likely lead Prime Minister Zapatero to 
withdraw the 1,300 Spanish troops from Iraq. 
Here again, it is also important to examine the impact of Spain’s history and 
culture on the question of why it chose to respond to this attack. The fact that Spain 
had been actively engaged against the ETA for nearly four decades prior to the 2004 
attack could indicate that it is more likely to respond to terrorist actions. On the 
other hand, the most prominent tactic used against the ETA is the judicial system.182 
Remember that for the purposes of my study a case is only considered to be a 
“React” case if there are measures taken beyond the judicial system. Spain’s history 
                                                                                                                                                                             
181 (2004, 2) 
182 (Sunderland 2005, 14; Ramos 2005, 132) 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
57 
 
with the ETA is unlike the UK’s history with the IRA because the UK had settled the 
concerns with the IRA prior to its attack in 2005. On the other hand, the ETA was an 
ongoing issue for Spain, so it is more challenging to use this story as an indication 
for why Spain did react. 
I believe that a paradigm shift occurred within the Spanish community 
following the attack on March 11. Prior to being attacked, Spain, much like many 
other European countries, did not believe that it would be the target for a terrorist 
attack.183 Yet this perception changed as a result of the attack especially because 
many Spaniards made the causal connection that the attack was the result of Spain 
supporting the U.S. in Iraq.184 This shift is important because it could be seen as the 
catalyst for the PSOE to win the elections three days after the attack. A sense of 
safety particularly from the measures taken against the ETA had arisen in the years 
leading up to the attack in 2004.185 The Spanish citizens no longer felt safe in their 
country and perceived their lack of safety to be a result of the war in Iraq.  
Counterfactual Analysis 
While it is impossible to know the actual outcome, it is interesting to 
consider what would have happened in Spain had the elections not taken place 
three days after the attacks. Therefore, in this portion of the analysis, the focus will 
shift to consider a counterfactual history of the Spain 2004 case. The analysis 
provided in the Discussion section explains the extensive role that the election cycle 
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played in the aftermath of the attacks. From this analysis, a question arises: What 
would the outcome of the Spain 2004 case if the timing of the attack had not 
occurred three days before the parliamentary elections? If we take a step back and 
study the details, this case actually demonstrates more similarities to a “Non-React” 
case than a “React” case. In this counterfactual analysis, I will operate under the 
assumption that Prime Minister Aznar is holding office.  
One of the big points of contention in the original case surrounds the fact that 
the government was quick to blame the ETA for the attacks and then continued to 
assert that the ETA was responsible despite evidence otherwise. The evidence 
indicates that this might have been a protective measure in light of the upcoming 
election. While I still believe that the Spanish government would have initially 
insisted that the ETA was responsible for the attacks, based on the past encounters 
with the ETA attempting similar attacks, without election pressure, the government 
might have been more responsive to evidence indicating that another group was 
responsible. Prime Minister Aznar would have been able to garner more votes by 
proving that the ETA was responsible, which can explain his insistence that the ETA 
was the responsible group. But without the electoral pressures, he might have also 
considered how if the group responsible was an Islamic terrorist organization that it 
could also strengthen his government’s decision to enter a coalition with the United 
States in Iraq.  
Given that the PP and Prime Minister Aznar supported the U.S. efforts in Iraq, 
it seems unlikely that even with the knowledge that the group responsible was 
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affiliated with Islamic extremism that it would have withdraw its troops and 
support from the U.S. efforts in Iraq. If anything, it is plausible to believe, based on 
the original instance that the ETA was responsible, that Prime Minister Aznar would 
have found a way to make the situation proof that the war in Iraq was necessary. 
That is because the attack could be viewed as proof of the growing threat of Islamic 
terrorism and thus could be used as a counterexample for the opposition to the 
country’s involvement in the U.S. coalition in Iraq. Additionally, the Spanish troops 
with a force of 1,300 people constituted approximately only one percent of their 
American counterparts’ troop quantity.186 Given the relative size of Spanish troops 
to American troops the claim that the attack was a result of Spanish presence in Iraq 
might not have carried as much weight as it did with an election happening within 
hours of identifying the responsible group as Islamic extremists. So without the 
election pressures, Aznar’s government might have viewed the attack as an 
opportunity to increase support in Iraq.  
Following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Spain 
made changes to its own institutional structures that were related to national 
security. Ramos summarizes those changes below 
Nine months after 11 September, the new National Intelligence Centre (CNI) was 
established, responsible for domestic and international intelligence, as a substitute 
for the former Defence Information Centre (CEID). The new organisation has been 
complemented by very powerful information services, such as those that belong to 
the Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil, and works closely with international 
intelligence agencies. The same law that created the CNI also established a 
coordination commission, presided over by one of the government’s vice presidents. 
The commission includes the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and 
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Economy, with the same purpose of coordinating all information and intelligence 
organisations in Spain.187  
These changes are important to consider when thinking about the counterfactual 
history because given that institutional changes had already occurred in Spain, it is 
less likely that additional changes would have occurred later. If we return to the 
“windows of opportunity” argument from the literature review, then we know that a 
window of opportunity for institutional change had already occurred internationally 
following September 11, but the Spain 2004 case, while also a “Large” event did not 
have as many deaths as September 11.188 Therefore, this case created a smaller 
“window of opportunity” than September 11 and it would have been less likely for 
an institutional change to have occurred as a result of this attack.  
United States (2001) 
While the events on September 11, 2001, took place at three different 
locations and are counted as four separate events in the GTD, this section will 
consider all the attacks together as one. As millions Americans made their way to 
work on September 11, 2001, four fully fueled air planes were hijacked between 
8:14 A.M. and 9:28 A.M.189 American Airlines Flight 11, from Boston to Los Angeles, 
was the first plane to be hijacked. At 8:46 A.M. the plane crashed into 1 World Trade 
                                                          
187 (2005, 127) 
188 (Bossong 2013, 142) 
189 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, 32-33). The main source used in this case study will be The 
9/11 Commission Report (2004) because of its reliability. President George W. Bush called for the 
creation of this commission as a result of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Over the course of three 
years, the ten commissioners "reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed 
more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries" (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, xv). Given the 
breadth of information reviewed, this document will suffice as the single document to provide the 
majority of the information for this case study. 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
61 
 
Center (North Tower). United Airlines Flight 175, also from Boston to Los Angeles, 
was the second hijacked plane that made its way to New York City. This plane 
crashed into 2 World Trade Center (South Tower) at 9:03 A.M. The next flight to be 
hijacked was American Airlines Flight 77, headed from Washington D.C. to Los 
Angeles. Once hijacked, the plane was re-directed to the Pentagon, where it crashed 
at 9:37 A.M.  
Finally, United Airlines Flight 93, from Newark to San Francisco, was 
hijacked, but failed to reach the intended target when the passengers on the plane 
fought back against the terrorists. This did not stop Ziad Jarrah, the terrorist pilot, 
from crashing the plane into an empty field just outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania 
at 10:03 A.M.190 Evidence indicates that United 93 had a potential target of either 
the Capitol or the White House.191 According to the START GTD, all four combined 
events lead to 2,997 casualties, including the nineteen terrorists. The database was 
unable to provide an estimate for the number of people that were injured as a result 
of these attacks. This qualifies September 11, 2001, to be analyzed as a large case in 
this project’s dataset.  
The attack on September 11 was not the first time that the World Trade 
Center had been the target of a terrorist attack. At 12:18 P.M. on February 26, 1993, 
a bomb was exploded from within a truck that was located in the parking garage 
beneath the two towers. There were six deaths and over one thousand reported 
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injuries as a result of this attack.192 It has been reported that “Ramzi Yousef, the 
Sunni extremist who planted the bomb, said later he had hoped to kill 250,000 
people.”193 This attack is critical for the discussion of the 2001 attacks for two main 
reasons. First, beyond judicial measures, the 1993 attack can be classified as a non-
react event. I will return to this point in the Discussion section. Second, the 
involvement of Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter KSM), is a 
common thread between the 1993 and 2001 attacks. The 9/11 Commission 
described KSM in the following manner: “No one exemplifies the model of the 
terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal 
architect of the 9/11 attacks.”194  
KSM, as the principal architect for 9/11, was operating under the direction of 
Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda195. Reports indicate that KSM first met with bin Laden 
in 1996 and during this meeting he proposed what would later become the plans for 
the attack on 9/11.196 Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6 of The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) 
all provide background information about past encounters between al Qaeda, 
particularly with bin Laden, and the United States prior to the attacks on September 
11. Foley summarizes many of the detailed events in the following paragraph:  
While Al-Qaeda was networking with other groups during the 1990s, it was also 
developing its core organization, as well as recruiting and training its own 
operatives and building a structure of operational and support cells in a number of 
countries. Having spent most of the previous eight years in Sudan, Bin Laden 
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returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and established his base and a number of terrorist 
training camps there. Thousands flowed through these camps, but no more than a 
few hundred seem to have become Al-Qaeda members. Some of those recruited 
joined the operational cells that were to become increasingly active from the mid- to 
late-1990s. The 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 
attack on the US battleship Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000 were carried out by 
Al-Qaeda cells under the supervision of Bin Laden and his chief aides. The 
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington were similarly directed 
by Bin Laden and his principal associates.197 
The main idea behind Foley’s analysis is that bin Laden’s al Qaeda network was 
growing rapidly not only in terms of membership, but also in terms of training those 
members. Al Qaeda was able to signal its growing strength through the attacks 
against the World Trade Center in 1993, the U.S. embassies in 1998, and the U.S.S. 
Cole in 2000. With each attack, al Qaeda moved one step closer to its ultimate attack 
in 2001. 
Each of the four hijacked planes was intended to make cross-country flights 
on the morning of September 11. While there is no definitive evidence, it is likely 
that these flights were chosen because the planes would then have lots of jet fuel in 
the tanks to create larger explosions at the target locations. Three of the four flights 
had five hijackers aboard, but United 93 only had four hijackers.198 While there was 
confusion on some of the flights about the weapons that the terrorists had armed 
themselves with, evidence indicates that the terrorists primarily used mace, pocket 
knives, and the threat of bombs to subdue the passengers. Some passengers, in cell 
phone calls, stated that the terrorists had firearms, but no evidence can support 
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these claims.199  
Discussion 
This discussion section will feature several different areas of analysis. To 
begin the discussion, I will explain the differences between the 1993 attack and the 
2001 attack in the United States. Then I will unpack the two different reactions that 
the U.S. had a result of the 2001 attacks: “Institutional Change” and “Policy Shift.” 
Next, I will apply Walt’s balance of threat theory to the 2001 case. Finally, an 
analysis of the way that the U.S. perceives terrorist attacks will be provided to fully 
explain why the U.S. was a react case instead of a non-react case in 2001.  
If the United States 1993 attack had been included as a case in this analysis, I 
would have coded it as a “Non-React” case because there were no measures taken 
beyond the judicial actions following the attack. The United States 1993 case would 
also have been coded as a “Large” event with a total magnitude of 1,006 deaths 
and/or injuries. When the U.S. is attacked in 2001, I coded it as a “React” case. This 
bears a striking difference to the Japanese cases that were studied in Chapter 3. Both 
of the Japanese cases were executed by the same organization, much like both of the 
U.S. attacks. In the 1994 Japan case, there was evidence that a second attack would 
occur. To relate this to the U.S. case, the 1993 attack indicated that the World Trade 
Center could be a potential target of attacks by al Qaeda. Yet there is a divergence in 
comparing these cases when examining the number of deaths that result from each 
attack. In the Japan 1994 attack, there were seven deaths. There were twelve deaths 
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as a result of the Japan 1995 attack. In 1993, at the World Trade Center six people 
died. The U.S. 2001 case caused 2,997 deaths. Both Japanese cases caused a similar 
number of deaths. But with the U.S. case and its 1993 attack, there is an exponential 
increase in the number of people who are killed as a result of the terrorist actions. 
This difference may explain why there is divergence between how I coded the 
Japanese cases as “Non-React” and the U.S. 2001 case as “React,” particularly when 
the U.S. 1993 attack would have qualified as a “Non-React” case in my study.  
There are two different ways that the United States reacted following its 
attacks in 2001. The first reaction is an “Institutional Change.” In November 2002, 
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which called for the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (hereafter, DHS). President George W. Bush 
offered the proposal entitled “The Department of Homeland Security” in June 
2002.200 The proposal explains that “The mission of the Department of Homeland 
Security would be to: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from 
attacks that do occur.”201 Prior to the creation of the DHS, more than one hundred 
different government organizations dealt with homeland security.202 Under the DHS, 
twenty-two separate departments are combined with the strength of one.203 
Ironically, an “Institutional Change” quite similarly structured to the DHS was 
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proposed in a publication from March 2001. Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government 
Response: Operational and Organizational Factors (2001) includes a final chapter, 
by Douglas Menarchik, which outlines the historical path of homeland security and 
his recommendations for improvements to the system.204 Most notably, Menarchik 
calls for unification of the various departments responsible for homeland security 
under one guidance.205 Less than two years later, this idea would become a reality as 
a result of the events on September 11.  
The second reaction is a “Policy Shift.” In this case, the shift in policy was a 
declaration of war both metaphoric and literal. Immediately following the attacks, 
President George W. Bush declared a war against terrorism, more colloquially 
known as the “War on Terror.”206 Wilcox Jr succinctly describes that “On the basis of 
compelling information that the Osama bin Laden group was responsible for 
September 11, the United States launched military attacks against the militant 
Islamist Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had given refuge to bin Laden and his 
senior Al Qaeda henchmen.”207 This case is different from the other cases that have 
been previously analyzed because the group responsible was an international 
terrorist organization. Therefore, any actions taken against those responsible will 
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need to take place in a manner other than through domestic judicial measures. Put 
differently, any actions taken against the terrorists would have to happen at the 
international level because the domestic judicial system does not have jurisdiction 
against the group. 
The United States opted to take measures beyond the domestic judicial 
system by tracking down top al Qaeda officials. Following the attacks on September 
11, many top officials in the organization were forced into hiding. Among those in 
hiding were Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.208 In 2011, a 
group of U.S. Navy SEALs located and killed Osama bin Laden. Yet a “second-tier 
leadership for al Qaeda had already emerged in place of top leadership.209 So while 
Americans may have viewed the killing of bin Laden as a success in the campaign 
against terrorism, his death did not have much impact on the fluid network of al 
Qaeda and its international presence. 
Wilcox Jr (2002) also offers another way to analyze why the United States 
may have opted for the “Policy Shift” rather than a judicial option. He writes that: 
On the few occasions when the United States has used force to punish or preempt 
terrorism, the public response has been very positive. A swift, strong, military 
reaction has an immense cathartic effect in satisfying the anger and outrage 
Americans feel about terrorist killings of innocent citizens. Force is regarded as an 
effective message that the United States will not be intimidated by terrorism and a 
warning to others that such attacks will be avenged. Compared to the tedious and 
uncertain alternative of using criminal law in response to terrorist crimes, the 
military option offers the appearance of swift justice.210 
This quote will begin the discussion about how history, culture, and perception play 
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a role in determining whether or not a country will respond to a terrorist attack. The 
fact that previous uses of force over judicial measures have had successful results in 
the past could explain why the government made a similar decision to act with force 
given the events of September 11. With its historical roots, the use of force has 
become a cultural norm when responding to terrorist attacks in the United States. 
Also the positive response that the use of force has received from the public 
supports the government’s decision to use force in a similar manner given the 
events of this case. One of the key parts of this quote is the last sentence which 
explains that the use of force over criminal proceedings “offers the appearance of 
swift justice.” Following the attacks on September 11, the public was outraged and 
calling for swift justice against the attackers.211  
Before continuing the discussion about how history, culture, and perception 
of terrorism each play a role in this case, I want to apply the same theoretical 
framework that I have been using in each case. Walt’s balance of threat theory 
hinges on four main factors: (1) the other actor’s available resources; (2) 
geographic location; (3) offensive power; and (4) offensive intentions. In this case, 
the U.S. was aware that al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks. And while the 
government will never a complete picture of al Qaeda’s available resources, the fact 
that it was able to fund nineteen terrorists to fly fully loaded passenger planes into 
targets indicated that its resources were quite substantial. The two described 
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reactions came even before the 9/11 Commission was able to uncover some 
information regarding the actual resources available to the group. The second 
factor, geographic location, is more challenging to analyze in this case given that al 
Qaeda is an international organization. However, given that many of the involved 
actors were from countries in the Middle East, the United States focused its policy 
reaction on this location. According to Walt’s theory, however, the geographic 
distance between the U.S. and the countries with which it declared war should have 
been a deterrent for a response. As I noted earlier, the attacks leading up to 
September 11 can be seen as signals of al Qaeda’s offensive power. The fact that this 
case reported 2,997 deaths and an undocumented amount of injuries are evidence 
of al Qaeda’s offensive intentions.  
This case provides a unique opportunity to examine the offensive intentions 
of the attackers beyond the proxy of combined magnitude. Chapter 11 of Without 
Precedent seeks to explain the 9/11 Commission’s mission to answer the question: 
What were al Qaeda’s motives? Two answers are offered to this question: religion or 
a hatred for the American public/what the United States stands for.212 To further 
explain these answers it is critical to also examine the locations of the attacks in 
terms of symbolic value. Evidence presented by the 9/11 Commission suggests that 
each of the targets was selected based on its symbolic importance. For example, 
Mohamed Atta, one of the key leaders of the attacks, wanted one of the targets to be 
a nuclear facility, but top leadership in al Qaeda vetoed this idea because there was 
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not enough symbolic value attached to a nuclear facility.213 The World Trade Center 
was chosen for its cultural connection to the “arts.”214 The WTC could also have been 
viewed as a symbol of the economic strength of the United States. The Pentagon was 
chosen because of its symbolic value to the American “law” and the Capitol or White 
House target was supposed to be representative of American “politics.”215 While the 
9/11 Commission never directly stated why it is important to view the targets as 
symbols of American culture, examining the targets in this light can help answer 
questions relating to the offensive intentions of al Qaeda.  
 The ways that history and culture overlap is manifested in the manner 
through which a country perceives terrorism. As with all of the other cases, the 
United States does have a history with terrorist organizations, particularly with al 
Qaeda. What makes the U.S. different from the other cases that when the U.S. is 
subjected to a terrorist act it perceives the attack as not only a threat to the nation, 
but also to the international community as a whole. That is because an attack 
disrupts international peace and could indirectly impact U.S, interests abroad.216 
Given that the U.S. government perceives an attack in the U.S. as an attack against a 
larger community, this could explain the “Policy Shift” that occurred following the 
attacks on September 11. The “Policy Shift” was aimed at not only protecting the 
United States, but other countries against similar attacks from al Qaeda in the future.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
212 (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 233) 
213 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, 245) 
214 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, 248) 
215 (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, 248) 
216 (Wilcox Jr 2002, 27) 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
71 
 
Russia (1999) 
Given the nature of the events, the Russia 1999 and Russia 2002 cases will be 
explained together. The cases are closely related because the Russia 1999 case can 
be seen as a catalyst for the Russia 2002 case. This will be explained once 
background for the Russia 1999 case has been outlined. An analysis of the response 
to the Russia 1999 attack will be provided after the explanation of both the 1999 
and 2002 attacks. Although, as explained in Chapter 2, it is still possible to examine 
the Russia 1999 case as a medium event and the Russia 2002 case as a small event. 
As an additional note, the Russia 1999 case background will not be as robust as the 
background for the other cases because many of the details surrounding this attack 
are still shrouded.  
The Russia 1999 case is a series of attacks at various locations in Russia over 
the course of several days. Two of the attacks occurred in Moscow and the third 
attack took place in Volgodonsk.217 On September 9, an explosion occurred at an 
apartment building on Guryanova Street. Next came an attack, on September 13, on 
Kashirskoye Highway. Finally, on September 16, a third explosion was set off in 
Volgodonsk.218 In terms of overall impact, Dunlop refers to this series of explosions 
                                                          
217 Myers, Steven Lee. 2003. "Russia Closes File on Three 1999 Bombings." The New York Times. May 
1, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/01/world/russia-closes-file-on-three-1999-
bombings.html. 
218 Carr, Jeff. 2013. "Re-Examining the 1999 Apartment Bombings in Russia." February 20. 
http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/re-examing-1999-apartment-bombings-russia; 
Dunlop, John. 2013. "The Moscow Bombings of September 1999." February 20. 
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as the Russian version of 9/11.219 Dunlop has called for the formation of a 
commission, similar to the 9/11 Commission, to finally uncover the entire story of 
the attacks.220 Across all three explosions there were 289 deaths and an additional 
464 people were injured.221 Based on this magnitude, this case is coded as a medium 
size attack.  
One of the challenging parts of analyzing this case is that the responsible 
group is still unclear based on the literature. According to Carr, “The state moved 
quickly to place the blame on Chechen extremists.”222 Wright offers a similar note by 
stating “Although, there was no direct proof the Chechen terrorists were behind the 
attacks, most Russians assumed that they were and demanded vengeance.”223 The 
use of the word assumed casts doubt on whether or not the Chechen extremists 
were actually responsible for this series of bombings. Dunlop’s recent book on the 
topic has caught the media’s attention. Carr writes that “According to the New York 
Review of Books, the volume ‘makes an overwhelming case’ that Russian authorities 
were complicit in the attacks that not only killed hundreds of their own civilians, but 
set off a chain of events catapulting Vladmirovich Putin to the presidency.”224 With 
the implication that the Russian government may have set off the bombs as part of a 
plan to get President Putin elected, many questions relating to this attack remain. 
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However, I will examine this case in light of the fact that the Russian prosecutor 
general’s office closed the case in 2003 by stating that the responsible party was a 
group of Islamic extremists. It is critical to note that “…none of those accused 
appeared to be Chechens themselves. Rather, they were Muslim fighters from other 
regions, which raise questions about Russia’s stated reason for starting the second 
war in Chechnya only weeks after the bombings.”225  
Russia (2002) 
As I explained in Chapter 2, the Russia 2002 case is different from the other 
cases for a variety of reasons. It is included as a case study based on a counterfactual 
history. Additionally, this is the only case that examines a hostage situation. Yet it 
can be read as an extension and response to the Russia 1999 case because Chechen 
extremists were aiming at stopping the war in Chechen, which will be further 
explained below.226  
Nord Ost was Russia’s first musical and it drew crowds that filled theaters. 
The evening of October 23, 2002 was no exception: Russia’s premier musical was 
playing for a sold out audience.227 At 9:05pm, Chechen extremists stormed onto the 
stage and forced the actors to sit in the audience. Then they made their demands: 
Russia must stop the war in Chechnya within three days or all 800 people in the 
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theater would die. Additionally, if there was an attempt by Russian forces to seize 
the theater back from the terrorists, everyone would die immediately.228 If their 
demands were not met, and Russia refused to withdraw its troops the extremists 
were willing to “…start shooting the hostages one by one before blowing up the 
theater….”229  
A total of forty two Chechen extremists, led by Movsar Barayev, watched over 
their hostages and waited for a response from the Russian government. Calling 
themselves Chechen freedom fighters, all of the extremists are willing to die for 
their demands.230 To make their threat credible, the extremists placed two large 
explosives in theater seats: one in the center of the theater and another on the 
balcony. Each of these explosives was guarded by a female suicide bomber. Twenty-
five additional female suicide bombers sat among the audience members ready to 
die for their cause. In addition to hand guns, the terrorists also had over one 
hundred hand grenades.231 
One striking fact about these Chechen extremists is that when they posted 
their flag at the front of the theater, it bore Arabic script. The female suicide 
bombers were also dressed in black robes and wore headdresses to cover their faces 
with Arabic expressions stitched into the tops. Front these symbols, it appeared as 
though an “Islamicization” had struck the Chechen movement.232 Hahn (2007) 
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further explains this “Islamicization” as a direct tie to al Qaeda operatives. He writes 
that 
The Chechen terrorists who seized Moscow’s Dubrovka theatre in October 2002 
used al Qaeda’s communication strategy to the letter, sending a video to the al-
Jazeera television station showing a hostage scene replete with Islamist propaganda. 
The footage showed female suicide bombers wearing Islamic veils in front of a green 
banner inscribed with the Arabic words “Allahu akhbar” (God is great). Throughout 
the video the captors used bin Laden’s slogan: “We desire death even more than you 
desire life.” International jihadists, like al Qaeda, are now the model for Chechen-led 
jihadists’ terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare throughout the North Causcasus.233 
The connection between Chechen extremists and al Qaeda indicates the growing 
strength of the al Qaeda network. So Russia was not just facing the threat of 
Chechnya, but of its allies in the al Qaeda network.  
Initially the only communication about the situation was through the use of 
cell phones that the terrorists distributed among the audience members. The 
hostages were required to call anyone they knew and explain what was happening 
and the terrorists’ demands. For the first day and a half of the situation, the Russian 
government officials were nervous because they had no communication from the 
inside beyond the initial phone calls. The Chechen extremists did not want to talk.234 
Despite the lack of communication, the Russian government did not sit idly. Instead 
it was working hard to create a plan to successfully raid the theater without causing 
the terrorists to follow through with their threat to blow up the building if it was 
breached by police and military forces.235 Yet the decision to take the theater by 
force signals that Russia is unwilling to consider withdrawing its troops from 
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Chechnya. Wright notes that only “…one thing is certain, Putin will never agree to 
pull out of Chechnya.”236  
As the plans for raiding the theater begin to emerge, one plan is considered 
to be more viable than the rest, but it does not come without risk. The Russian 
government was aware that the resolve of the Chechen extremists was incredibly 
high and that a forced entry would likely lead to a bloody battle. Chechen resolve 
was signaled when a young civilian woman entered the theater to demand that the 
siege be given up. She was shot dead immediately.237 Based on this event, the 
Russian government had little hope that a forced entry would end the situation. 
Instead, it needed a plan to subdue the terrorists before entering the complex. At 
this point, a highly controversial plan was created to fill the theater with a knockout 
gas. Using knockout gas would not only affect the terrorists, but also the hostages. 
And given the unpredictability of how knockout gas can affect an individual; the 
government was running a risk of using it on nearly 850 people.238 Dr. Mark Wheelis 
explained that knockout gas affects an individual’s central nervous system; 
therefore the authorities needed to use just enough to knockout everyone, but not 
enough to cause lethality.239 Despite the potential risks, the plan garnered approval 
from Putin. Just hours before the deadline, Russian authorities began to leak the gas 
into the theater using the air conditioning system.240  
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As the gas began to leak into the theater, the Chechen extremists realized 
what was happening and immediately prepared to follow through with their plan. 
The women were ready to detonate their bombs and the men rushed to the front 
doors to thwart any chances of taking the building before the explosion occurred. 
Right as the Russia Special Forces entered the building, some of the hostages who 
had not been impacted by the gas walked out of the building.241 Within a half hour, 
the Russian Special Forces had killed all of the Chechen extremists without losing a 
single solider. Then they began to remove the hostages from the theater as quickly 
as possible because the Special Forces were afraid that the building was still going 
to explode.242 
As the Special Forces began to move the hostages out of the building, the 
impact of the risk of using a knockout gas became apparent. A total of 129 people 
died as a result of this incident.243 Whether or not the knockout gas was the cause of 
death of the hostages is still in question today. Each death certificate leaves the 
cause of death blank. Instead, forensic evidence has tried to establish that the lack of 
food, water, and movement were the cause of death. Alternatively, some victims’ 
families were told that their loved one suffered from pre-existing medical conditions 
that were the leading causes in their deaths.244 
In memory of the victims and to prove that the attacks did not have the 
desired impact, Nord Ost was re-staged in February 2004. Its nationalistic themes 
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were a sign of defiance against the terrorists. The actors wanted to prove that they 
were strong and could move beyond the event. Unfortunately, three months later, 
the show was forced to close because people feared that a copy-cat attack would 
occur. When the theater was renovated following the attack, the families of the 
victims fought to make sure that the memory of their loved ones would not be 
forgotten. To this day, a placard is hung outside of the building bearing the names of 
all of those lost in the event.245 
Discussion 
Both the Russia 1999 case and the Russia 2002 case lead to a “Policy Shift” 
with how Russian government handled the Chechnya territory. Following the 
attacks in 1999, the Russian government declared war on Chechnya, which would 
become known as the Second Chechen War.246 The decision to invade Chechnya 
received a 64 percent public approval rating in Russia.247 President Putin’s decision 
to invade Chechnya led to an increase in his approval rating as well. Carr (2013) 
reports that “His approval rating rose from 53 percent in September to 66 in 
October, and 78 in November.” So not only did the administration make changes in 
how it was handling Chechnya, but it was widely supported by the Russian people at 
the time that the decision was made to invade. Then the Russia 2002 case is also 
classified as a “Policy Shift” because the Russian government took a no concessions 
approach when the extremists made their demands that troops be removed from 
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Chechnya. Instead, the Russian government moved forward with its own rescue 
mission despite the threat that the building would be exploded if the Russian 
military tried to take the theater by force. Hahn explains that this “Policy Shift” 
became a more permanent change in the Russian government. He writes that “Since 
the beginning of the guerrilla war Putin’s policy has consisted of… refusing to 
negotiate with any Chechens….”248 
In order to garner a full understanding of why both Russian cases are coded 
as “React” cases, it is necessary to start with the history of the relations between 
Russia and the Chechnya territory. Chechnya and Russia have had a strained 
relationship since the mid-19th century when the Russian Empire first conquered 
the territory.249 Since that time, Chechnya has attempted to take several grasps of 
freedom. Most notably, Chechnya claimed independence from the Soviet Union 
during World War II and even declared war to assert their independence. But Joseph 
Stalin took action against this claim of independence and forced deported the 
Chechens to Siberia.250 Following these events, there have been both times of peace 
and times of conflict regarding the status of Chechnya within Russia.251 As I will 
explain later in this discussion section, the history of the region plays a role in how 
terrorism is perceived in Russia and thus provides a potential explanation about 
why the Russian government reacted with a “Policy Shift” for both cases being 
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examined.  
This case will benefit from the use of Walt’s balance of threat theoretical 
framework. When considering Chechnya’s available resources, there are two factors 
to consider. First is that the established tied between Chechnya and al Qaeda, which 
is stressed by The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) and Hahn (2007), can be 
interpreted as an increase in the number of resources available to Chechen 
extremists. In this case, the available resources from al Qaeda could be both 
monetary and knowledge of how to improve warfare tactics. The second factor to 
consider when thinking about available resources is the evidence that suggests that 
Chechen extremists were receiving funding from Russian government officials. 
Quite a bit of evidence has emerged in the years since the 1999 attacks that top 
Kremlin officials were funding Chechen extremists with the hopes of leading the 
country into war.252 If this evidence holds any weight, then the Russian government 
would have been aware of some of the resources available to Chechnya, which 
would have made the government more likely to react to the threat. Chechnya is 
located in the North Caucasus approximately one thousand miles south of Moscow 
and is completely landlocked.253 Given the location of Chechnya within Russia, the 
threat caused by attacks originating within the region would likely make the 
Russian government more responsive to any attacks. Additionally, considering the 
history of the region, Russia’s desire to keep Chechnya as part of Russia would make 
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it more likely to that the Russian government would respond to any attacks because 
the government would want to keep the region as non-reactive as possible. 
Offensive power in these cases can also be considered from the same angles as the 
available resources with the additional consideration taken about Chechnya’s 
display of power. The Chechen display of offensive power is most clear from their 
resolution to take eight hundred hostages and refuse any negotiations with the 
Russian government. With this display of power alone, Russia would be more likely 
to react to any attacks because the government could have been concerned about 
escalating the risk for its citizens. Finally, we will consider this case in terms of 
offensive intentions. Both the Russia 1999 case and the Russia 2002 case were 
actions taken by the Chechen extremists to harm as many people as possible in 
order to bring attention to their fight for independence.  
Mathematician Andrei Piontkovsky provides the best analysis about how 
Chechen terrorism was received in Russia during the times of both attacks. He 
explains that “…in the public consciousness, the word ‘Chechen’ has already become 
a synonym for ‘terrorist,’ and it is also linked to the word ‘destroy.’”254 So the 
general notion about Chechen terrorism was the Russian government had to put a 
stop to the actions. If we unpack this quote, then there is also a sense that the 
problem with Chechnya has moved from a dispute over regional autonomy to an 
issue of national security concern. This view is also expressed in the public support 
that the government received for its decision to invade Chechnya in 1999. Much like 
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the United States 2001 case, the Russian government receives swift public support 
for its strong use of force against the threat of a terrorist organization. The shift in 
focus of Chechnya being viewed as a location that is associated with terrorism 
instead of a location that desires political autonomy can also serve as an explanation 
for why there is a “Policy Shift” in both cases.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Assessment of Hypotheses 
My analysis has focused on an assessment of Walt’s balance of threat theory 
as it is related to assessing the threat of terrorism. The argument that has emerged 
throughout this analysis is that Walt’s theory can provide the basis for 
understanding why some countries will react to terrorist attacks and others will 
not; however, this theory fails to provide a complete explanation of this question. In 
order to fill in the holes that this theory leaves, we must consider three additional 
factors: a country’s history, culture, and perception of terrorism. Each of these 
factors can provide insight about why a country will choose to react and which 
reaction will be manifested. When considering this “full picture,” what we find is 
that no two cases are exactly the same, but that there can be some patterns that 
emerge.  
Perception of terrorism appears to be the key element to deciding whether 
or not a nation-state will react to a terrorist attack. While, the perception portion of 
the analysis relates most closely to history and cultural elements of my hypotheses, I 
did not directly account for this in my hypotheses. I have found that the discussion 
on history and culture of each nation-state informs the perceptions that nation-state 
has about terrorism. Japan perceives terrorism as a crisis management situation 
because of a cultural norm that formed following the historical period of a 
militaristic state. As a result, Japan does not want a strong police force or to take any 
actions to strengthen its national security forces. The United Kingdom is slightly 
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different because it treats terrorism as a crime, which calls for only judicial 
measures to take place following an attack. Even when faced with the choice of 
strengthening national security measures the United Kingdom is hesitant because of 
its history with the IRA. Yet when the United States was attacked in 2001 it viewed 
the terrorist actions as a threat to both national and international security. This is 
likely because of the escalation of attacks from al Qaeda against the United States. 
Additionally, historically the United States government received strong support 
from its citizens when force was used against threatening powers.  
The fact that both Japan and Russia both had two case studies strengthens 
the arguments about whether or not those nation-states will react to a terrorist 
attack. Yet the United States could be used as a counter-point given that there was a 
shift over time in how terrorism was perceived within the nation-state. To explain 
this, however, we need to consider the time lapse between all of the cases. The U.S. 
was attacked in 1993 and then again in 2001. During this time lapse there is a 
paradigm shift. Japan is attacked in 1994 and then again in 1995, but there is no 
change in the coding it as “Non-React” because during both events Japan viewed the 
attacks as a “crisis situation.” Russia is attacked in 1999 and 2002, but the fact that 
the reaction from the first attack caused the war that the second attack was 
protesting, it is unsurprising that the second attack would also result in reaction. 
In my analysis, there were three cases that were coded “Non-React” and four 
cases that were coded “React.” The Spain 2004 case, while coded “React,” bears 
differences from the other three cases with which it is grouped. This is highlighted 
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by the counterfactual analysis that I provide at the end of the case study. What 
makes this case different is that the reaction that occurred within the nation-state 
following the terrorist attack was driven by the citizens, through their right to vote, 
rather than by the government. Both of the Russian cases and the United States 
2001 case illustrate reactions from the nation-state that are driven by the 
government. While the governments of these nation-states may have been 
persuaded by the citizens, the ultimate responsibility for the changes is attributed to 
the governments of Russia and the United States. If we consider these case studies 
to be a sample of the all the cases available for consideration, then this indicates that 
when  reaction occurs as the result of a terrorist attack that it will most frequently 
be a reaction from the government of the nation-state that is attacked.  
This leads to a discussion about the three sub-hypotheses regarding the 
three types of reactions: “Government Change,” “Policy Shift,” and “Institutional 
Change.” For a “Government Change” to occur, I hypothesized that “If the citizens of 
a targeted country feel unsatisfied by the governmental response to a large terrorist 
attack and there is exogenous election timing, then an incumbent government or 
party will be unseated or voted out of office.”255 This hypothesis appears to be 
reflected in the Discussion section of the Spain 2004. Next, the “Policy Shift” 
hypothesis was “If a terrorist attack happens when a country is in negotiations with 
the terrorist network that causes the attack, then the government in the targeted 
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country will change its policies for handling the situation from diplomatic to 
military. Thus there will be an escalation in the situation.” Both Russian cases and 
the United States case were coded as “Policy Shift” cases. I believe that the evidence 
I uncovered tells a more powerful story about how history and culture dictate the 
types of responses, specifically policy responses that a nation-state is going to 
display. Therefore, I would say that this hypothesis was incorrect in light of the 
analysis that I provided. Finally, the “Institutional Change” hypothesis stated that “If 
a targeted country finds that a terrorist attack occurred as a result of a lapse in its 
national security institutions, then its national security institutions will undergo an 
organizational change in the aftermath of the attack.” The only case coded with an 
“Institutional Change” was the United States 2001 case. Once again, evidence 
appears to support this hypothesis.  
Future research could be done to test if this analysis could be used as a 
predictability model for future attacks. The idea would be use a nation-states 
history and culture to determine whether or not it would react to a terrorist attack. 
Then if it would be coded as a “React” situation, an author could then assess the type 
of reaction that the nation-state would have. This would be difficult to test, however, 
because it would be based on events that have not occurred yet or someone would 
have to wait until an event occurred that would elicit this type of analysis.  
Future Research 
To strengthen the argument that I have presented, I would want to apply my 
analysis to more case studies. Expanding the number of case studies would provide 
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a greater opportunity to hone in the specificities of the argument. The addition of a 
case that would not fit into the assessment that I have proposed would also be 
useful for understanding the weaknesses in my analysis. Conversely, taking the time 
to focus on each of the case studies individually could also yield more insight into 
the intricacies of the events, which might provide greater clarity on the analysis that 
I have already done. 
One of the problems that I encountered from using Walt’s balance of threat 
theory is that he never addresses how much weight should be given to each of the 
four factors that are outlined for determining the threat that another country poses. 
When translating this theory to my analysis on terrorism, I encountered a similar 
problem. I was uncertain about which factors should be weighed more heavily than 
others. This made some of the analysis challenging because it does not always offer 
a complete picture of why a country was reacted or did not react to a specific 
terrorist event. Further research could be done to try and see if there is a pattern 
that is associated with each of these factors and how each is weighted in various 
situations. This could either be done in Walt’s original intentions by examining 
when countries chose to create alliances with or against threatening state powers; 
another option would be to analyze this from the perspective of how countries 
weigh the threats of terrorist actions and terrorist organizations.  
In the literature review, I explained that the words “national security” and 
“homeland security” are often used interchangeably. Figure 3 in Appendix B shows 
that following 9/11 that “homeland security” is being used more frequently in 
How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks 
 
88 
 
literature. It would be interesting to study the driving factors of this increased 
usage. Additionally, trying to find if there is divergence between the two phrases 
and if there are differences in connotation could be another question for future 
research. In a similar line of analysis, a researcher could conduct interviews with 
authors to find out if there is a reason why one phrase is used over the other phrase 
in their publication. A study of that nature would unveil whether or not authors 
make conscious word choices in terrorism research. This type of research might be 
better suited for Linguistics or English; however, the overlap between the areas of 
study would be case for an interdisciplinary publication.  
Nature of the Cases Studied 
 To complete this analysis, I want to explain the nature of the cases that I have 
selected to study. If an average magnitude is calculated from the project dataset, it is 
500 deaths and/or injuries per event. If an average magnitude is calculated from the 
entire GTD database, it is approximately 5 deaths and/or injuries per event. I use 
these averages to illustrate the fact that the cases that I have selected to study are 
those with a much greater magnitude than the average case in the GTD database. 
The cases that I have selected for my dataset are not the “typical” scale terrorist 
attack. Figures 5 and 6 show the project dataset illustrated as a histogram.256 The 
take away point from Figures 5 and 6 is that many of the case studies that I selected 
to analyze in this thesis are outliers in the dataset. Yet these are the cases that most 
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frequently elicit a reaction. Figure 6 shows the number of cases in the project 
dataset with a magnitude of less than 1,000. This helps highlight that most of the 
cases tend to be smaller in scale. Research into this phenomenon might be able to 
provide more insight about whether or not magnitude impacts whether or not a 
nation-state will respond to a terrorist attack.  
 This thesis is meant to start the discussion on the variance in responses to 
terrorist attacks. As an area that has received little attention within terrorism 
research, the analysis that I have provided only scratches the surface of what could 
possibly be found. These cases may be outliers on the scale; however, the 
importance of each cannot be emphasized enough. I hope that my research will 
ignite others to ask similar questions and seek new answers. What I have learned 
through this process is that research is not simply about being right; it is about 
finding the right answers. Even if another researcher proves my analysis incorrect, 
there will be growth within the field of study. I encourage others to set upon the 
task of finding answers to these questions and many others that arise as a result of 
these questions. 
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Appendix A 
How to Use the GTD 
I drew upon several specific web pages from the GTD. Rather than citing each 
page individually, I will provide an explanation of how to navigate the database. 
Each event has a specific numerical identification code that can be used to locate it 
in the database. All of the codes follow the same format which consists of the date 
and a specific event code. The date is listed as “yyyymmdd.” So September 11, 2001 
would be coded as 20010911. Then the event code would be added to the end; for 
example, “0004” would then make the code 200109110004. Because the GTD will 
list each location as an isolated event, for example 9/11 is listed as four separate 
events in the database, I found that it is best to drop the last digit off the code when 
searching the database. When you do this, it will open all of the events that occurred 
on the specific date that you are researching. Any one of the cases that I analyzed in 
this thesis can be found through this method. For further information about the 
coding system and how the database can be used, please see the GTD Codebook, 
which is available online.257 
How to Use TOPs 
START TOPs is a qualitative database that was compiled by the Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). It is a subsection of the START 
GTD.  Much like the GTD, I use several web pages from START TOPs, so I want to 
provide an explanation of how to navigate this qualitative database. There is a 
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search box on the main page where you can enter the specific terrorist organization 
that you are looking for or there is an option to view an alphabetized list to find a 
group. So this database is quite simple to use. The only potential problem that you 
may encounter is making sure that you have the group name correct. This can be 
particularly tricky if the group name has been translated to English from another 
language. 
How to Use Google Books Ngram Viewer 
Google Books Ngram Viewer uses the corpus of Google books to graph the 
frequency of words and/or phrases used over time. Using the tool is very straight 
forward. You just type in the word or phrase that you want to see into the search 
box. If you have multiple words or phrases, those will need to be separated by 
commas. It is possible to change the time range, language, and smoothing effect on 
each of the graphs that you produce. IN order to provide the readers with the 
specific graphs that I created, I took a screenshot of the output. It is also possible to 
embed a link directly into a specific text.  
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Appendix B 
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Figure 5258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
258
 Figures 5 and 6 were produced using the dataset that I compiled for this analysis. The actual 
histograms were produced by Professor Mika LaVaque-Manty. I want to thank him for creating these 
histograms twice (once as a rough draft and the final product that you see here).  
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Figure 6 
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